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Abstract—This paper presents a comprehensive literature re-
view on applications of economic and pricing theory for resource
management in the evolving fifth generation (5G) wireless net-
works. The 5G wireless networks are envisioned to overcome
existing limitations of cellular networks in terms of data rate,
capacity, latency, energy efficiency, spectrum efficiency, coverage,
reliability, and cost per information transfer. To achieve the
goals, the 5G systems will adopt emerging technologies such
as massive Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO), mmWave
communications, and dense Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets).
However, 5G involves multiple entities and stakeholders that
may have different objectives, e.g., high data rate, low latency,
utility maximization, and revenue/profit maximization. This poses
a number of challenges to resource management designs of 5G.
While the traditional solutions may neither efficient nor applica-
ble, economic and pricing models have been recently developed
and adopted as useful tools to achieve the objectives. In this
paper, we review economic and pricing approaches proposed to
address resource management issues in the 5G wireless networks
including user association, spectrum allocation, and interference
and power management. Furthermore, we present applications
of economic and pricing models for wireless caching and mobile
data offloading. Finally, we highlight important challenges, open
issues and future research directions of applying economic and
pricing models to the 5G wireless networks.
Keywords- 5G wireless networks, massive MIMO, mmWave
communications, C-RAN, HetNets, resource management, pricing
models, economic theories.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing proliferation of smart devices together with
new emerging multimedia applications leads to the explosive
growth of mobile data traffic. According to the latest Visual
Network Index (VNI) report by Cisco [1], the global mobile
data traffic will reach 48.3 Exabytes per month in 2021, up
from 7.2 Exabytes per month in 2016. The growth of mobile
data demand has already created a significant burden on
existing cellular networks which has triggered the investigation
of the fifth generation (5G) cellular networks, abbreviated
as 5G. Several commissions have launched projects towards
5G. For example, the European commission has launched
more than ten European Union (EU) projects to address the
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architecture and functionality needs of 5G. Horizon 2020 [2],
the biggest EU Research and Innovation programme, provides
funding for the 5G-Public Private Partnership (5G-PPP) to
deliver solutions, architectures, technologies and standards for
the ubiquitous 5G communications infrastructures.
The primary technologies proposed for 5G are [3] mas-
sive Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO), dense Hetero-
geneous Networks (HetNets), mmWave communication, full-
duplex communication, Device-to-Device (D2D) communi-
cation, energy-aware communication and energy harvesting,
Cloud-Based Radio Access Networks (C-RANs), the virtu-
alization of network resources, and so on. Compared to
4G cellular networks, 5G is expected to [3] (i) improve at
least 1000 times of throughput, (ii) support higher network
densification, (iii) reduce significantly latency, (iv) improve
energy efficiency, and (vi) support a high density of mobile
broadband users, D2D, ultra reliable, and massive Machine-
Type-Communications (MTC).
However, the adoption of the emerging technologies intro-
duces challenges for the radio resource management such as
user association, spectrum allocation, interference and power
management. The reasons are (i) the heterogeneity and dense
deployment of wireless devices, (ii) the heterogeneous radio
resources, (iii) the coverage and traffic load imbalance of Base
Stations (BSs), (iv) the high frequency of handovers, (v) the
constraints of the fronthaul and backhaul capacities, and (vi)
a large number of users and stakeholders with different objec-
tives. The traditional methods, e.g., the system optimization,
can provide optimal resource allocation for the entire network.
However, they usually require a centralized entity, and the sig-
naling may be excessive for medium- to large-scale networks.
Moreover, it is difficult to incorporate economic implication
into the solutions. Therefore, the traditional methods may not
be suitable for 5G, especially when the rationality of users and
stakeholders are important.
A. What and Why Economic and Pricing Approaches
Since 5G involves multiple entities and stakeholders that
may have different objectives, e.g., high data rate, low latency,
utility maximization, cost minimization, and profit maximiza-
tion, economic and pricing approaches have been recently
developed and adopted as useful tools to reach the objectives.
They allow to model and analyze complex interactions among
the entities and stakeholders. Through the interactions, each
entity can observe, learn, and predict status/actions of other
entities, and then has the best decisions based on equilibrium
analysis. In other words, the economic and pricing approaches
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2are inherently suitable for distributed autonomous decision
making. Therefore, they are applicable to 5G which consists of
a large number of autonomous network entities. Specifically,
compared with the traditional approaches, the economic and
pricing approaches provide the following advantages:
• Economic and pricing models with their simplicity pro-
vide fast and dynamic user association schemes which
can adapt to the fast variations of the wireless channels
and frequent handovers in 5G. Also, through negotiation
mechanisms, economic and pricing models enable the
user association to achieve multiple objectives such as
throughput maximization, fairness, and load balancing.
• The adoption of the emerging technologies enables 5G
to provision heterogeneous resources to users. Economic
and pricing models such as combinatorial auction allow
users to explicitly request bundles of diverse resources
to satisfy their dynamic demands and to improve the
resource utilization.
• The dense deployment of cells increases the spectrum
reuse among network operators in 5G. Economic and
pricing models allow the network operators to quantify
their own revenues or profits before deciding to share
spectrum.
• The dense and unplanned deployment of wireless devices
complicates the dynamics of interferences in 5G. Eco-
nomic and pricing models such as Stackelberg game can
provide distributed and dynamic solutions for the inter-
ference and power management with small information
exchange and low computational complexity.
• The dense deployment of wireless devices along with the
huge traffic demand of users increases the burden in terms
of bandwidth on backhaul and fronthaul links. Economic
and pricing models such as congestion-based pricing or
tiered pricing regulate user demands which mitigates the
congestion as well as maximizes the resource utilization
and revenue for network operators.
• The burden on the backhaul and fronthaul links can be
reduced by using wireless caching. The wireless caching
employs network devices close to the users, e.g., small
cells, to cache popular contents from remote servers.
Economic and pricing models such as contract theory in-
centivize the selfish owners of the small cells to contribute
their resources.
Note that the economic and pricing approaches have a com-
mon assumption that the stakeholders in the system are rational
and react to the strategy for the highest utility. In some cases,
the assumption does not hold, e.g., due to limited available
information and observation, which confines the applicability
of the traditional economic and pricing approaches. Neverthe-
less, the economic tools dealing with bounded rationality such
as evolutionary games can still apply.
B. Contributions of the Paper
Although there are several surveys related to 5G, they do
not focus on economic and pricing approaches, which are
emerging as a promising tool. For example, the survey of
emerging technologies of 5G was given in [4], the survey of
resource management toward 5G was presented in [5], and the
survey of user association in 5G was given in [6]. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no survey specifically discussing the
use of economic and pricing models to address the resource
management in 5G. This motivates us to deliver the survey
with the comprehensive literature review on the economic and
pricing models in 5G.
For convenience, the related approaches in this survey are
classified based on resource management issues and then
major objectives as shown in Fig. 1. The resource management
issues include user association, spectrum allocation, interfer-
ence and power management, and wireless caching and mobile
data offloading. Furthermore, advantages and disadvantages of
each approach are highlighted.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly describes key technologies of the 5G wireless networks.
Section III presents the fundamentals of economic and pricing
models. Section IV discusses how to apply economic and
pricing models for the user association. Section V reviews ap-
plications of economic and pricing models for the spectrum al-
location. Applications of economic and pricing models for the
interference and power management are given in Section VI.
Section VII considers economic and pricing approaches for
wireless caching and mobile data offloading. Important chal-
lenges, open issues, and future research directions are outlined
in Section VIII. Section IX concludes the paper. The list of
abbreviations appeared in this paper is given in Table I.
II. OVERVIEW OF 5G WIRELESS NETWORKS
Recent wireless research activities have already considered
many technology trends towards 5G as illustrated in Fig. 2.
In this paper, we focus on the technologies related to the
TABLE I: Major abbreviations
Abbreviation Description
ACA Ascending Clock Auction
ADMM Alternating Direction Method of Multiplier
BBU/RRH BaseBand processing Unit/Remote Radio Head
CAPEX/OPEX CAPital EXpenditure/OPerational EXpenditure
FAP/PBS Femto Access Point/Pico cell Base Station
FH/CP Femto Holder/Content Provider
HetNets Heterogeneous Networks
KKT/NUM Karush-Kuhn-Tucker/Network Utility Maximization
MNO/MVNO Mobile Network Operator/Mobile Virtual Network Op-
erator
MBS/SBS Macro cell Base Station/Small cell Base Station
MUE/FUE/RUE/DUE Users of MBS/FAPs/RRHs/D2D
MTC/M2M Machine-Type-Communications/Machine-to-Machine
IBGA Increment-Based Greedy Allocation
PMP/VCG Paris Metro Pricing/Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
PO/SO/SP Primary Operator/Secondary Operator/Service Provider
RAT/CoMP Radio Access Technology/Coordinated Multi-Point
RSSI Received Signal Strength Indication
SINR/RB Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio/Resource Block
WDP Winner Determination Problem
3Applications of economic and pricing models for 
resource management in 5G wireless networks
Energy cost 
minimization
Interference 
mitigation 
Spectrum allocation
(Section V)
Data rate 
maximization 
Revenue 
maximization 
System utility 
maximization 
Interference and power 
management 
(Section VI)
Energy efficiency 
optimization 
through offloading
Wireless caching and 
mobile data offloading
(Section VII)
Profit maximization
through caching
User association 
(Section IV)
Throughput 
maximization
Load balancing 
and fairness
Energy efficiency 
optimization
Fig. 1: A taxonomy of the applications of economic and pricing models for resource management in 5G.
function improvements of Base Stations (BSs). The reason
is that BSs play an important role in guaranteeing Quality-
of-Service (QoS) by providing connections to mobile users
through the air interface. Besides, the spectrum used for the
connections is the scarcest resource. Especially, more than
80% of energy consumption of telecommunication networks
is for the operation of BSs [7]. In following subsections, we
discuss four key technologies which have the most significant
impact on progressing towards 5G: (i) massive MIMO, (ii)
HetNets, (iii) mmWave communications, and (iv) C-RAN.
A. Massive MIMO
MIMO technology has been widely adopted in many wire-
less standards including LTE as it significantly improves the
capacity and reliability of wireless transmission. However, the
conventional MIMO with the limited number of antennas is
not scalable [8]. To achieve high multiplexing gains, massive
MIMO, also known as large-scale antennas systems, has been
proposed. In the massive MIMO, each BS is equipped with
a very large number of antennas, e.g., a few hundreds, and
the antenna array is typically designed in a two-dimensional
grid with an antenna spacing of at least λc/2, where λc is the
wavelength at the intended carrier frequency fc.
The antenna array allows transmitted power to be concen-
trated in small regions in the space based on the principle
of coherent superposition of wavefronts, thus significantly
improving the energy efficiency. Besides, extra degrees of
freedom can be provided through using inexpensive low-
power components such as RF amplifiers. The total power
consumption is thus reduced. The massive MIMO system also
uses spatial modulation and spatial multiplexing. The spatial
modulation encodes data symbols of users based on (i) the
signal constellation including PSK/QAM symbols and (ii) the
antenna index via an information-driven antenna-switching
mechanism [9]. Then, the spatial multiplexing simultaneously
transmits the independent and separately encoded data signals,
so-called spatial streams, of users from each transmit antenna
of the antenna array. As such, a number of users can be si-
multaneously served using the same time-frequency resource,
and the spectral efficiency is substantially improved.
The spatial streams of users are considered to be gener-
ated by slicing physical resources such as bandwidth, power,
backhaul/fronhaul, infrastructure, and antennas of the mas-
sive MIMO system. In fact, to satisfy dynamic demands
of users, the massive MIMO system allows the users to
explicitly request bundles of physical resources. For example,
the users can specify the amount of spectrum and power
as well as the number of antennas. However, this imposes
an important issue for the resource allocation. The issue is
how to allocate the bundles of physical resources to the
users to accommodate their dynamic demands while satis-
fying requirements of efficient resource allocation, e.g., high
resource utilization and energy efficiency. To address the issue,
optimization-based dynamic resource allocation mechanisms,
e.g., [10], were proposed. Economic and pricing models such
as combinatorial auction provide an optimal allocation of
resource bundles/combinations to the users with little global
information requirement and high economic efficiency.
B. Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets)
HetNets are one key technology which combines different
types of cells such as macrocells and small cells, e.g., picocells
and femtocells. The macrocells are covered by Macro Base
Stations (MBSs), and the small cells are covered by Small cell
Base Stations (SBSs) such as Femto Access Points (FAPs),
Pico cell Base Stations (PBSs), and Relay Stations (RSs).
The coexistence of different cells forms a multi-tier HetNet
which results in better performance in terms of capacity,
coverage, spectral efficiency, and total power consumption.
Key features of cells used in HetNets are given in Table II.
As seen, compared with macrocells, the small cells have much
smaller coverage. Shrinking the transmission range of the cells
leads to ultra-dense networks, i.e., ≥ 103 cells/km2 [11],
which allows to serve the high density of users, i.e., up 600
active users/km2. To enhance further spectrum and energy
efficiencies, the HetNets exploit the versatile and local area
networks such as the D2D and Machine-to-Machine (M2M)
communications. The adoption of these networks leads to
another tier with the elimination of cells.
Apart from multiple tiers, HetNets leverage spectrum of
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Fig. 2: Technology trends in 5G era. Arrows indicate the potential technologies deployed in 5G.
TABLE II: Types of cell deployed in 5G HetNets.
Cells Transmit
power (W)
Coverage
(km)
Deployment
scenarios
Users
Femtocell 0.001 to 0.25 0.01 to 0.1 Indoor Up to 30
Picocell 0.25 to 1 0.1 to 0.2 Indoor/outdoor 30 to 100
Microcell 1 to 10 0.2 to 2 Indoor/outdoor 100 to 2000
Macrocell 10 to 50 8 to 30 Outdoor >2000
different Radio Access Technologies (RATs), including ex-
isting RATs, e.g., Wi-Fi, Evolved High-Speed Packet Access
(EHSPA+), LTE, and new 5G RATs. As such, each user can
simultaneously transmit/receive data to/from BSs with differ-
ent RATs, e.g., through the Coordinated Multi-Point (CoMP)
technology [12]. Such a multi-RAT environment provides a
significant gain in terms of capacity, reliability, coverage, and
spectrum efficiency.
Heterogenours and dense deployment of wireless devices
allow 5G to provision radio resources in terms of spectrum,
power, and cache storages. However, this raises radio resource
management issues such as user association, resource alloca-
tion, and interference management. The design of sophisti-
cated radio resource management schemes for the issues is
thus needed. To evaluate the resource management schemes,
five performance metrics are commonly used as follows:
• Spectrum efficiency: Spectrum efficiency is defined as the
average achievable data rate per unit bandwidth.
• Energy efficiency: Energy efficiency is the ratio of the
total network throughput to the total energy consumption.
• Load balancing: Load balancing is the capability to
balance traffic across the entire network.
• Fairness: Transmission rate fairness among users is typ-
ically measured by the Jain’s fairness index [13] as(∑N
i=1 ri
)2
N
∑N
i=1 r
2
i
, where N is the number of users, and ri is
the rate of user i.
• Interference: Two common interferences to be mitigated
are intra-tier interferences among cells within the same
tier, and inter-tier interferences among cells in different
tiers.
To optimize the above performance metrics, traditional
approaches for the radio resource management may not be
efficient in 5G HetNet environment. For example, the Received
Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) [14] is typically used in user
association schemes. The scheme is based only on the received
signal strength from BSs rather than on the traffic load of the
BSs. This might result in unbalanced traffic load among BSs
and low network throughput. For the interference management,
optimization methods for power control are typically used. The
methods usually require central controllers which may lead
to the huge signaling and computational overhead. Recently,
economic and pricing models have been efficiently adopted
to address the above issues. For example, for the interfer-
ence management, an MBS sets penalty prices according to
interferences caused by SBSs, and then the SBSs locally
reduce their transmit power to avoid the high payment. Such
a simple pricing strategy mitigates the inter-cell interference,
5enables the MBS to obtain a higher revenue, and reduces the
information exchange and computational complexity.
C. Millimeter Wave (mmWave) Communications
Spectrum shortage of existing frequency bands, e.g., the
3G and 4G bands, becomes imminent. On the other hand,
there is a vast amount of unused or lightly used spectrum in
the mmWave band ranging from 30-300 GHz, the wavelenths
of which are 1-10 mm. Therefore, mmWave communications
have been proposed to be a potential candidate for 5G which
can provide multi-gigabit communication services [15].
Compared with existing communication systems using
lower carrier frequencies, mmWave communications suffer
from high propagation loss and have shorter range due to the
high rain attenuation and atmospheric absorption. However,
considerable works [15] on mmWave propagation confirm
that for small distances, the rain attenuation and atmospheric
absorption do not create significant additional path loss for
mmWaves, particularly at 28 GHz and 38 GHz. As shown
in Table III, at 28 GHz, the rain attenuation is 0.9 dB over
200m. Also, the attenuation over 200m caused by atmospheric
absorption is only 0.012 dB at 28 GHz and 0.016 dB at 38
GHz.
The above features imply that the mmWave communications
can overcome the strong path loss problem when small cells,
e.g., picocells and femtocells, with the radius smaller than
200m are deployed. They are thus suitable for 5G. However,
exploiting high frequency bands with narrow beams imposes
several challenging issues. Specifically, the mmWave commu-
nications (i) are sensitive to blockage by obstacles, e.g., walls
and human body, (ii) often suffer from the deafness, i.e., the
misalignment between the main beams of the transmitter and
the receiver, and (iii) require a dense deployment of mmWave
BSs. These issues lead to frequent handovers and make radio
resource management in 5G be more challenging. For exam-
ple, existing user association schemes are only sub-optimal
for mmWave systems [16]. Economic and pricing models with
their simplicity provide fast and dynamic association schemes
which can adapt to the fast variations of the wireless channels
in mmWave systems.
TABLE III: Common mmWave bands in 5G and propagation
characteristics at precipitation rate of 25 mm/h and the distance of
200m) [15]. LOS stands for Line-Of-Sight.
Frequency Propagation Rain Oxygen Available
band loss (LOS) attenuation absorption bandwidth
28 GHz 1.8-1.9 0.9 dB 0.04 dB 500 MHz
38 GHz 1.9-2 1.4 dB 0.03 dB 1 GHz
73 GHz 2 2.4 dB 0.09 dB 2 GHz
D. Cloud-Radio Access Network (C-RAN)
C-RAN is a centralized, cloud computing-based architecture
for radio access networks [17] in which the BaseBand process-
ing Units (BBUs) of conventional BSs are moved to the cloud,
i.e., the BBU pool, and separated from the radio access units,
namely Remote Radio Heads (RRHs). The functions of the
BBU pool and RRHs are as follows.
• BBU pool performs the centralized baseband processing
functions such as coding, modulation, and Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT).
• RRHs perform digital processing, RF amplification,
up/down conversion, filtering, Digital-to-Analog
(DA)/Analog-to-Digital (DA) converters, and interface
adaptation. The RRHs with antennas transmit radio
signals to users in downlink and forward the baseband
signals from users to the BBU pool in uplink. The RRHs
are connected to the BBU pool via fonthaul links.
• Fronthaul links can be realized by optical fiber or mi-
crowave connections. The optical fibers can provide high
bandwidth, i.e., up to 40 Gbps, while the microwave
communications have the limited available bandwidth,
i.e., a few hundred Mbps. However, the microwave com-
munications are faster and cheaper to deploy than optical
fibers.
The BBU assignment for each RRH can be implemented
using distributed or centralized approaches. For the distributed
approach, each RRH directly connects to its exclusive BBU.
This approach is simple and easy to be deployed, but it is
not flexible to exploit the advantages of joint signal process-
ing and central controlling in C-RAN. For the centralized
approach, several RRHs are served by a BBU, and thus it
has many advantages in terms of scalability, network capacity,
coverage, interference mitigation, and CAPital EXpenditure
(CAPEX)/OPerational EXpenditure (OPEX) reduction.
In particular, the centralized BBU assignment can be di-
vided into two categories, i.e., partially and fully centralized
solutions. For the partially centralized solution, the L1 (Layer
1, PHY) processing is implemented at the RRH which reduces
the burden in terms of bandwidth on the fronthaul links. How-
ever, this solution is less optimal because resource sharing is
considerably limited and advanced features such as CoMP and
joint processing Distributed Antenna System (DAS) cannot be
efficiently supported. For the fully centralized solution, the
functionalities of the L1, L2 (Layer 2, MAC), and L3 (Layer 3,
network) are moved to the BBU pool, and the aforementioned
advantages of the C-RAN can be achieved. However, the main
disadvantage is a high load on fronthaul links due to the In-
phase and Quadrature-phase (IQ) data transmission between
the BBUs and RRHs. It significantly increases the latency and
jitter, especially when a large number of RRHs are deployed.
Thus given the constraint of the fronthaul capacity, new
radio resource management solutions need to be developed
to regulate the resource consumption of RRHs as well as their
users. Such solutions can be easily realized by economic and
pricing models. For example, the tiered pricing [18] sets high
prices to users with high resource demands, and thus reducing
their resource consumption proportionally.
Summary: In this section, we provide a brief overview of
key technologies potentially deployed in 5G, e.g., the massive
MIMO, HetNets, mmWave, and C-RAN. In each technology,
radio resources, resource management issues, and motivation
of using economic and pricing models are highlighted. The
next section presents some basics and fundamentals of eco-
nomic and pricing models.
6III. OVERVIEW AND FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMIC AND
PRICING THEORIES IN 5G WIRELESS NETWORKS
This section presents the background of economic and
pricing models which have been proposed for resource man-
agement schemes in 5G. In fact, there are several different
pricing models depending on how to set the price. For exam-
ple, when the price is set based on the profit maximization
problem, we have profit-maximization pricing. In particular
for our survey, the price is commonly determined using non-
cooperative game, Stackelberg game, auctions, and Network
Utility Maximization (NUM) problem. The following subsec-
tions present fundamentals of the pricing models.
A. Non-cooperative game
Non-cooperative game is a game with competition among
players. The players are selfish to maximize only their own
utilities without forming coalitions with each other. Consider
a radio resource market including N competitive MNOs as
the sellers which compete for selling spectrum to users, i.e.,
buyers. The strategy of MNO i is to select spectrum price pi to
maximize its own utility pii(p1, . . . , pN ). Here, the utility may
be the revenue or profit that the MNO receives from selling the
spectrum. Let p∗i be the best strategy, i.e., the best response,
of MNO i which maximizes its utility. Then, the set of the
best strategies p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
N ) is the Nash equilibrium if
no MNO can gain higher utility by changing its own strategy
when the strategies of the others remain the same.
Generally, the Nash equilibrium is a stable strategy profile
and is the major solution concept of the non-cooperative
game. However, it may not always exist and if it exits, it
may not be unique. Thus the existence and uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium need to be checked and proved when
setting prices based on the game. One common method for
proving the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
is to check if the strategies of the players are non-empty,
compact, and convex, and if their utility functions are concave
or quasi-concave [19]. Different popular methods prove that
the game is a potential game or supermodular game. Since the
non-cooperative game models the conflict of selfish players,
it has been commonly applied in environments with high
competition or limited resources. In 5G, it is used for spectrum
trading with competitive MNOs as proposed in [20] or data
rate allocation to multimedia applications as proposed in [21].
Note that the Nash equilibrium is obtained as the solution
when all players make their decisions at the same time.
However, if at least one player can make decision before the
other players, the Stackelberg game [22] can be adopted.
B. Stackelberg game
Stackelberg game is a sequential game in which players
consist of leaders and followers. The leaders choose their
strategies first, and then the followers make corresponding
strategies based on the leaders’ strategies.
Consider again the model in Section III-A with two MNOs,
i.e., MNO 1 and MNO 2, as spectrum sellers. The optimiza-
tion problem of each MNO is to choose its spectrum price
pi, i ∈ 1, 2, so as to maximize its utility pii(p1, p2), i ∈ 1, 2.
Assume that MNO 1 decides its pricing strategy before MNO
2 does, then MNO 1 is called the leader, and MNO 2 is called
the follower. The optimization problems of the leader and the
follower together form the Stackelberg game. The objective of
such a game is to find the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Definition 1. Let p∗1 and p∗2 be solutions of the optimization
problems of the leader and the follower, respectively. Then, the
point (p∗1, p
∗
2) is the Stackelberg equilibrium for the Stackelberg
game if for any (p1, p2) with p1 ≥ 0 and p2 ≥ 0, we have
pi1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) ≥ pi1(p1, p∗2) and pi2(p∗1, p∗2) ≥ pi2(p∗1, p2).
To compute the Stackelberg equilibrium, the backward
induction method [23] is commonly used. Consider again the
above example, for a given p1, the follower solves its problem
to find p∗2, and then the leader substitutes p
∗
2 in the leader
problem to find p∗1. Due to the first-move advantage, the leader
imposes a favorable solution to itself. Thus the utility of the
leader at the Stackelberg equilibrium is guaranteed to be no
less than that at the Nash solution. This feature makes the
Stackelberg game suitable for the resource management in 5G.
For example, it allows an MBS to decide optimal interference
prices after measuring transmit power of SBSs as proposed
in [24] or interferences caused by SBSs as proposed in [25].
However, given the high density of the SBSs, how the MBS
observes and then decides the optimal strategies is challenging.
C. Auction
Auction is an efficient way of allocating resources to buyers
which value the resources the most. A number of auctions and
their descriptions can be found in [26] and [19]. The following
briefly presents the major auctions used in this survey. Note
that an auction typically consists of three entities: buyers, i.e.,
bidders, sellers, and an auctioneer. The auctioneer is an entity
that organizes the auction, and it can be the same as the seller.
1) Vickrey and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions:
Vickrey and VCG auctions are the sealed-bid auctions in
which bidders submit simultaneously their sealed bids to the
auctioneer.
• Vickrey auction: In this auction, bidders submit bids, i.e.,
bidding prices that they are willing to pay for a commod-
ity to the auctioneer. The auctioneer selects the bidder
with the highest bid as the winner. The winner pays the
second-highest price rather than the highest price that it
submitted. Since the winner pays the price less than its
expected price, the Vickrey auction motivates bidders to
bid their true valuations for the commodity. The auction
thus achieves truthfulness. This is an important property
because any resource allocation scheme without holding
this property may be vulnerable to market manipulation
and reduce the revenue for the seller due to the low
valuations [19].
• VCG auction: The VCG auction is a generalization of
the Vickrey auction for multiple commodities. The VCG
auction assigns the commodities to bidders in a socially
optimal manner. It then charges each bidder the loss of the
social value due to the bidder’s getting the commodity.
Such a payment strategy enables the VCG auction to be
7a truthful mechanism. In 5G, this auction can be used to
enhance the fronthaul resource utilization in the C-RAN
as proposed in [27].
2) Combinatorial auction: Combinatorial auction allows
each bidder to bid a bundle of heterogeneous commodities
rather than a single commodity [28]. After receiving bids, the
auctioneer solves a Winner Determination Problem (WDP)
which determines an optimal allocation of the commodities
to the bidders under constraints, e.g., the supply constraint.
Compared with the traditional auctions such as the Vickrey
auction, the combinatorial auction has advantages such as
utility maximization for buyers. However, it has one big
challenge for solving the WDP. The WDP is generally NP-
hard, and there does not exist a polynomial-time algorithm.
The Lagrangian relaxation approach [29] has been commonly
used to find approximate solutions for the WDP. In 5G, the
combinatorial auction is often used in massive MIMO systems
as proposed in [30] to allocate heterogeneous resources, i.e.,
antennas and bandwidth, to users.
3) Ascending Clock Auction (ACA): ACA is a type of
multiple-round auctions in which the auctioneer raises the
commodity price in each round until the total demand is equal
to or less than the supply. Consider a model including one
MNO as a spectrum seller and multiple users as bidders,
i.e., buyers. Initially, the MNO announces a spectrum price
to all the users. Each user submits its spectrum demand so
as to maximize the user’s utility. If the total demand is equal
to or less than the supply, the MNO concludes the auction.
Otherwise, the MNO increases the spectrum price and then
announces again this price in the next auction round. This
process is repeated until the total demand is equal to or less
than the supply. Since the utility and the demand of each user
decrease with the increase of the auction rounds, the algorithm
converges. Due to its simplicity, the ACA has been used in
complex markets such as heterogeneous resource allocation
in massive MIMO systems as proposed in [31] or wireless
caching in dense HetNets as proposed in [32]. However, the
ACA is not a truthful mechanism since the users have an
incentive to misreport their true demands which can lead to
higher utility.
4) Forward, reverse auction, and double auction: Consid-
ering the sides of sellers and buyers, auctions can be classified
as follows [26]:
• Forward and reverse auctions: In the forward auction,
multiple buyers compete for commodities by submitting
their bids, i.e., bidding prices, to one seller. On the
contrary, in the reserve auction, multiple sellers compete
to sell commodities by submitting their asks, i.e., asking
prices, to one buyer.
• Double auction: In the markets with multiple sellers and
buyers, the double auction can be used to match the
sellers and the buyers. Specifically, the sellers and buyers
respectively submit their asks and bids to an auctioneer.
Then, the auctioneer sorts the sellers in the ascending
order of their asks and the buyers in the descending order
of their bids. The auctioneer finds the largest index l at
which the ask pal is less than the bid p
b
l . The transaction
price is determined as (p
a
l +p
b
l )
2 . The seller receives the
transaction price, and the buyer receives spectrum. The
process is repeated to determine the remaining seller-
buyer pairs, transaction prices, and spectrum allocation.
Under certain conditions and settings, the double auction
holds desired economic properties such as truthfulness,
individual rationality, balanced budget, and economic
efficiency.
D. Network Utility Maximization (NUM)-based Pricing
NUM is proposed to allocate resources, e.g., bandwidth
and power, to users so as to maximize the total net utility
of users given the capacity constraint of the network. Con-
sider a network model with one MNO as the resource seller
and multiple users as buyers. Then, the net utility of each
user is the difference between the utility associated with its
resource allocation and the cost that the user pays the MNO
for using the resources. To solve the NUM problem, price
update schemes can be used as presented in [26]. Briefly,
by applying the dual decomposition and gradient methods,
the MNO iteratively updates resource prices. Also, the users
iteratively select their amounts of resources to maximize their
own net utilities. The utilities of the users are assumed to
be concave functions of their resource allocation, and the
NUM problem is a convex optimization problem. Therefore,
the algorithm converges to a unique optimal solution for the
resource allocation.
In 5G, NUM-based pricing is often applied to maximize
the total data rate of users. For example, it is used for the
aggregated carrier allocation in HetNets as proposed in [33]
or for data rate allocation in massive MIMO systems as
proposed in [34]. However, these approaches mostly require
utility functions of users to be strictly concave.
Apart from the aforementioned pricing models, matching
theory and contract theory have been used for the resource
management in 5G. In general, the matching theory assigns
users to MNOs given their preferences, and the contract
theory constructs resource-price bundles under an information
asymmetry between users and MNOs.
Summary: In this section, we introduce the basics of
economic and pricing models proposed to address resource
management issues in 5G. Specifically, we provide the defi-
nitions, mechanism descriptions, and rationale behind the use
of economic and pricing models for the resource management.
In the subsequent sections, we review economic and pricing
approaches for addressing various resource management issues
in 5G.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR USER ASSOCIATION
Before data transmission commences, a user association
mechanism is performed to determine which user to be as-
signed to which BS. The user association mechanism must
be designed to optimize metrics such as throughput, load
balancing, and energy efficiency. Centralized solutions, e.g.,
[35], often require a large amount of signaling and have
high computational complexity, which may not be a viable
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Fig. 3: User association based on distributed auction in mmWave
networks.
solution for large-scale networks, especially for HetNets. Al-
ternatively, economic and pricing models can provide dis-
tributed solutions to optimize the aforementioned metrics
with low computational complexity. This section discusses
applications of economic and pricing models for the user
association in 5G. Refer to [6], this section is classified based
on metrics which the user association mechanisms aim to
achieve, i.e., (i) throughput maximization, (ii) load balancing
and fairness, and (iii) energy efficiency optimization, in the
following subsections, respectively. Note that each metric can
be considered in different technologies, e.g., massive MIMO,
mmWave, and HetNets. For example, energy efficiency can
be considered to be a major requirement when designing the
user association in massive MIMO networks due to the large
energy consumption of antennas. On the contrary, given the
ultra-dense and unplanned deployment of BSs, throughput
maximization and load balancing among BSs/tiers can be set to
be the major requirements in the user association in mmWave
networks and HetNets, respectively.
A. User Association for Throughput Maximization
A common objective of the network aims to maximize the
total throughput of all users in 5G. Distributed auction or
distributed algorithms with price update schemes are used to
achieve the objective with low complexity.
1) Distributed auction: The first work based on the dis-
tributed auction was investigated in [36] for a mmWave
network. The model is shown in Fig. 3 in which users act as
bidders, i.e., buyers, and BSs are sellers. Initially, the BSs set
connection prices to zero and broadcast them to all the users.
Each user calculates its utility and payment based on the prices
and its required throughput. The user then selects the best BS
which yields the user’s maximum utility. The user sends its
required throughput as a bid and its payment to the BS. The
BS selects users with the highest bids and higher payments
than the old price. The BS increases its price and then feeds
back the new price to the users. The auction terminates when
there is only one request user, and this user is associated with
the BS. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme
can improve network throughput around 12% compared with
the RSSI-based association scheme [14]. In addition to the
throughput improvement, the proposed scheme considers the
optimization of operating beamwidth to address the deafness
problem. Accordingly, the network throughput of the proposed
BS
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Fig. 4: User association based on NUM problem in multi-RAT
environments.
scheme increases when the beamwidths are narrower. How-
ever, the narrower beamwidths lead to significant alignment
overhead since many directions have to be searched. The future
work can consider this effect in the optimization of bidding
process.
The distributed auction-based approach was also found in
[37] to assign each user to each SBS in a HetNet. Here,
the SBSs are powered by harvested energy. Different from
[36], users in the proposed scheme are considered to be
commodities while the SBSs act as bidders, i.e., buyers. A
coordinator which ensures that the commodities are sold in a
fair manner is the auctioneer or seller. Each SBS selects the
number of users to serve depending on its state, i.e., amount,
of harvested energy. Since the SBS is uncertain about the
state which has to be determined before the user association
process, it assigns probabilities to the possible energy states.
Then, a multi-round assignment is adopted. At each round,
the auctioneer announces arbitrary prices for commodities,
i.e., the users. Given the prices and the probabilities of the
states, each SBS calculates and submits its demand, i.e., the
number of commodities so as to maximize its expected utility.
The auctioneer adjusts the price of the commodity using the
Walras’ tatonnement process [38] such that the total demand
equals the supply. The commodity allocation and the prices
at this point constitute a so-called Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
[39]. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme
outperforms the distance-based assignment [40] in terms of
aggregate network throughput. However, how to select the
probability distribution function for the states is not specified
in the proposed scheme.
2) Utility maximization: Consider a HetNet with multi-
RAT, the authors in [41] formulated the NUM problem to
jointly associate users with BSs, e.g., MBSs or SBSs, and
allocate spectrum segments. The objective is to maximize the
sum of the users’ utilities. As shown in Fig. 4, each BS as a
seller owns multiple RATs, and each RAT may have multiple
spectrum segments to be sold to the users, i.e., buyers. To solve
the NUM problem, the Lagrange duality theory is first applied
with multipliers as spectrum segment prices that the users pay
the BSs. The distributed algorithm with the price update is
then executed. Specifically, each BS broadcasts initial prices
to its users. Given the prices, each user locally decides on the
BS and spectrum segment of the BS to maximize its utility.
The BS updates the prices using the projected gradient method
[42] which ensures that the total traffic load generated by the
9users equals the maximum capacity of the BS. The algorithm
is guaranteed to converge to a near-optimal solution of the
original NUM problem. The simulation results show that the
proposed scheme improves the network throughput up to 20%
compared with the RSSI-based association scheme.
By using the projected gradient method, the distributed
algorithm in [41] is guaranteed to converge to the global
optimal solution. However, to ensure the convergence, all the
prices of the BSs need to be updated at the same time using
the same step size. This requires synchronized price updates
across the BSs, which is challenging in implementation in
large-scale networks. The dual coordinate descent method
[43] can be an alternative solution as proposed in [44]. The
model and the design of the distributed algorithm for the
user association in [44] are similar to those in [41]. However,
after applying the Lagrange dual problem, the dual objective
function is expressed in a closed form, and the BSs use the
dual coordinate descent method to update the prices. As such,
the BSs do not need to synchronize their price updates, and the
algorithm has faster convergence than that using the projected
gradient method. However, the dual coordinate descent method
is not guaranteed to converge to a global optimum solution
since the closed-form objective function is not differentiable.
B. User Association for Load Balancing and Fairness
Apart from the throughput improvement, load balancing
among BSs and fairness of users need to be considered in the
user association. Pricing models such as distributed auction,
congestion-based pricing, and Paris metro pricing can well
meet the requirements.
1) Distributed auction: The authors in [16] addressed the
joint association and relaying problem in a mmWave network
considering the load balancing at BSs. The model involves
multiple BSs and multiple users. As shown in Fig. 3, a user
can be associated with one BS via one of other users which
serve as relays. The joint association and relaying problem
generally has no closed-form solution and is NP-complete,
but it is convex [45]. Thus, the problem can be equivalently
converted into the min-cost flow problem which is then solved
by the distributed auction as presented in [36]. Note that the
bidders are the users, i.e., the buyers, and the sellers are the
relays. The proposed scheme is proved to converge quickly
when the number of request users for one relay is sufficiently
large. The reason is that an increase of the price which is set by
the relay is proportional to the number of users requesting to
access the relay. Therefore, given a large number of users, one
relay will become too expensive in a short time compared with
other relays, and there is only few users which can then accept
the price. However, a large number of users make the overall
convergence speed of the proposed scheme slow. This may not
meet the fast variations of the mmWave channel conditions.
2) General pricing: A distributed algorithm via Lagrangian
dual decomposition for the user association to achieve the
load balancing and the fairness in a mmWave network was
proposed in [34]. The model consists of multiple BSs, i.e.,
sellers, each of which can serve multiple mobile users, i.e.,
buyers. To achieve load balancing and fairness, a channel
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Fig. 5: Market-based fractional user allocation in a massive MIMO
network.
utilization metric, i.e., the ratio of the required data rate of the
user to the channel capacity, is introduced. The problem is to
minimize the maximum BS utilization. Here, the BS utilization
is the sum of the channel utilizations. First, the Lagrange dual
problem is applied with the multipliers as service prices that
the users pay the BSs. Then, the subgradient method [46]
with the price update is adopted. Generally, each user locally
determines its BS so as to minimize its payment, and the BSs
communicate with each other to update the prices to regulate
users’ requests and to balance the channel utilizations among
the BSs. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme
outperforms the RSSI-based scheme in terms of convergence
and fairness among BSs measured by the Jain’s fairness index.
However, updating prices at each iteration may significantly
increase a communication overhead of the proposed scheme.
3) Utility maximization: The price updating adopted from
[34] can be combined with the NUM problem to achieve
fairness and load balancing in a massive MIMO network
as proposed in [47]. The model is shown in Fig. 5 which
consists of multiple users and multiple BSs. Each of the BSs
is equipped with a large number of antennas. Note that each
BS, i.e., a seller, can serve multiple users, and each user, i.e.,
a buyer, can simultaneously be associated with multiple BSs
to achieve its desired data rate. The objective is to maximize
the total utility of all users. Here, the utility is represented by
a logarithmic function which allows the allocation to achieve
the proportional fairness. The utility is a concave function,
and the problem is convex optimization. The price updating
in [34] is used again to solve the problem. However, different
from [34], given the BSs’ service prices, each user chooses a
set of BSs and the corresponding resource fractions so as to
maximize its total bang-per-buck. The bang-per-buck offered
by a BS to a user is defined as the maximization of the ratio
of the rate allocated to the user to the price that the user pays
the BS.
4) Congestion-based pricing: The congestion-based pricing
[48] sets the connection prices depending on the current
network load. Thus it can be used to achieve the load balancing
as proposed in [49]. The considered model is a HetNet as
shown in Fig. 6 which includes users of one MBS, i.e.,
MUEs, and multiple SBSs, i.e., femtocells. The problem is to
determine the amount of bandwidth which the SBSs allocate
to the MUEs so as to maximize the difference between the
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total utility of the users and the total cost that the MBS pays
the SBSs. To solve the problem, the Lagrange dual problem
with the distributed algorithm as proposed in [41] is adopted.
However, the multipliers are shadow prices associated with the
rate and the bandwidth, and they are updated by the gradient
descent method [50]. At each iteration, given the shadow and
congestion prices of the SBSs, each user selects the best SBS
to maximize the ratio of the rate to the sum of the prices
offered by the SBS. A more general scenario with multiple
MBSs needs to be investigated. However, the interaction
between the MBSs and SBSs can be more complicated.
Apart from small cell networks, M2M networks will be
deployed in 5G HetNets which allow a wide range of au-
tonomous devices to communicate wirelessly without human
intervention. A massive number of M2M devices create the
overload problem which hugely impacts the radio access and
core networks of the cellular system. Thus the congestion-
based pricing can be used as proposed in [51]. The model
consists of M2M devices as source nodes and routes. The
source nodes as buyers buy routing services from the routes,
i.e., pairs of nodes, as sellers to forward packets to their des-
tinations. Each route sets a routing price proportionally to the
number of source nodes which connect with the route. Given
the routing prices, each source node selects the routes with
the minimum prices. The routes adjust the prices according to
the supply and demand rule to balance the connections among
the routes.
5) Paris Metro Pricing (PMP): PMP is used in Paris metro
to give passengers the ability to select less congested wagons
[52]. For Internet service, the PMP is applied to set different
prices for services based on QoSs [53]. For example, channels
with higher prices would be less congested than those with
lower prices. The authors in [54] employed the PMP for the
user association in the multi-RAT environment of a HetNet to
balance the traffic among RATs. The model consists of one
MNO as a seller and multiple users as buyers. The MNO owns
different RATs, and the users decide which RAT they prefer
to access depending on the RAT’s current access price and the
users’ congestion sensitivity. First, the MNO assigns randomly
the users to its RATs. Then, it collects and calculates system
information including the available capacity and the number of
connected users to each RAT as well as the access price for the
RAT. In particular, the access price of the RAT depends on the
availability of the RAT’s capacity. The MNO then broadcasts
the system information to the users, each of which chooses
the RAT which maximizes its utility. Then, the MNO accepts
or denies the user depending on the available capacity of the
RAT. The steps are repeated until no user desires to switch
to another RAT. However, how to prove the stability of the
algorithm is not presented.
6) Forward auction: In the context of a multi-tier HetNet
including a large number of BSs, i.e., MBSs and SBSs, the
authors in [55] adopted the forward auction for the user
association to achieve the max-min fairness, i.e., maximizing
the minimum SINR received at each user. The users are
bidders, and the BSs are sellers. Each BS has its association
price that a user pays if the user is associated to the BS.
Each unassigned user finds the BS which maximizes the user’s
utility, i.e., the channel gain between the user and the BS minus
the association price. The user also calculates its bid, i.e., the
difference between the largest utility and the second largest
utility, and submits it to the BS. Upon receiving the bids, the
BS selects the user with the highest bid as the winner. The BS
cancels the previous association and adds a new association
with the winner. Then, the BS increases its association price
by the winner’s bid as its new price. Note that the winner is
not guaranteed for a long-term association, e.g., when the BS
finds a new user with a higher bid. This may discourage users
to participate in the auction.
C. User Association for Energy Efficiency Optimization
Energy efficiency is also a common requirement for the user
association in 5G due to the tremendous number of antennas
in massive MIMO networks. The pricing models based on the
NUM problem and repeated game are developed for the energy
efficiency improvement.
1) Utility maximization: The authors in [56] developed
a user association algorithm in a massive MIMO network
considering the energy efficiency, fairness, and QoS provision.
The model consists of multiple BSs and users. The energy
efficiency of each user when associated with a BS is defined
as the ratio of the downlink data rate of the user to the
energy consumed by the BS. The problem is to find a user
association solution which maximizes the total utility of all
users subject to their minimum SINR requirements. The utility
of the user is a logarithmic function of the energy efficiency,
which is concave. To solve the problem, the Lagrange dual
theory is first applied with the multipliers as the dissatisfactory
factors of the users and the service prices that the users pay
the BSs. Similar to [34], the subgradient method is adopted
to update the dissatisfactory factors and the service prices.
Then, each user selects a BS so as to maximize the difference
between its achievable rate and the service price. As shown in
the simulation results, the proposed scheme achieves much
higher energy efficiency than that of the Reference Signal
Received Power (RSRP)-based user association [57]. How-
ever, the energy efficiency of the proposed scheme decreases
with an increasing number of antennas due to more energy
consumption.
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2) Repeated game: The repeated game can be used to
provide the distributed user association to improve the energy
efficiency in a HetNet with massive MIMO as proposed in
[58]. The repeated game allows players to repeat a so-called
stage game over multiple periods to achieve their objectives
[59]. The players in the network model include users and
BSs, i.e., multiple SBSs and one MBS equipped with a large
number of antennas. The users act as buyers, and the BSs
act as sellers. The utility of each user is a function of its
achievable rate, and the utility of each BS is the difference
between the total price paid by its connected users and the
cost of power consumption. First, each user/SBS forms a
descending order preference list in terms of its utilities gained
from all the SBSs/users. Then, each user bids for the top SBS
in its preference list. The SBS puts users with the highest
bids in the waiting list and rejects other users. The bidding
procedure is repeated for the rejected users. The SBS then
chooses to be turned ON for the users’ demands when the
total payment from its users is larger than the power cost.
Otherwise, the SBS is switched OFF, and the users in its
waiting list will connect to the MBS. The ON-OFF switching
strategy aims to improve the energy efficiency of the overall
network. As shown in the simulation results, the proposed
scheme improves significantly the energy efficiency compared
with the ACTIVE-IDLE switching procedure proposed in [60].
In practice, the assumption in which the utility of each user
is a function of only its achievable rate as mentioned in [58]
may not be reasonable since the users need to pay service
prices to the BSs. The authors in [61] introduced the cost, i.e.,
the service price, in the users’ utility functions when applying
the repeated game for the distributed user association. The
players in the game include users as buyers and a service
provider which owns BSs as the seller. Initially, the service
provider sets a service price of each BS for each user and
broadcasts the prices to the users. The prices are determined
so as to maximize the total payment that the service provider
receives from the users. Given the prices, each user chooses its
BS to maximize its utility. This process is repeated until both
the service provider and the users are satisfied with the prices
at which the total payment received by the service provider
and individual users’ utilities are maximized.
3) Cost minimization: D2D networks are also a tier of 5G
HetNets in which each D2D user as a source can transmit
its data to its destination by using different relay nodes.
The problem is to select relay nodes to minimize the energy
consumption cost of the source. The authors in [62] addressed
this problem by using the cost minimization problem. Initially,
given a forwarding price of each relay node, the source
determines the optimal fractions of data for the relay node to
minimize its total cost including the energy consumption and
monetary cost. Here, the monetary cost is determined based
on the forwarding price of the relay node. Note that if this
price is too high, the source may use other relay nodes. Thus
the relay node needs to set an appropriate price, e.g., reducing
the price while maintaining a positive profit. In particular, the
price adjustment is inversely proportional to the fraction of
demand of the source. Given the new price, the source solves
its problem again. The process is iterated until the optimal
data allocation does not change. However, how to solve the
source’s problem is not specified.
Summary: In this section, we have reviewed the appli-
cations of economic and pricing models for the user asso-
ciation in 5G. The objective is to achieve the throughput
maximization, load balancing, fairness, and energy efficiency
optimization. The reviewed approaches are summarized along
with the references in Table IV. Additionally, a summary of
advantages and disadvantages of major approaches is shown
in Table V. We observe that the utility maximization problem
with price updating schemes has been primarily used for the
user association. In fact, with the surge of data traffic and
limited spectrum resources, high spectrum efficiency is also
a major requirement of 5G. The next section thus discusses
how to apply the economic and pricing models for spectrum
allocation to enhance the spectrum efficiency.
V. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR SPECTRUM ALLOCATION
5G will support a large number of mobile users with
ubiquitous real-time services such as video streaming and
online gaming. The services are generally delay sensitive
and consume a large amount of spectrum. Thus spectrum
allocation schemes need to be developed to maximize the
spectrum efficiency, i.e., the transmitted data rate over a given
bandwidth. Traditional spectrum allocation schemes, e.g., [63],
can improve the overall data rate, but they often require
central servers and the cooperation among the users. This
may not be feasible in large-scale networks of 5G. Economic
and pricing mechanisms are proposed not only to provide
an incentive to different entities in spectrum allocation, but
also to introduce distributed solutions in which the spectrum
is efficiently assigned to the users based only on local ob-
servations. This section reviews the applications of economic
and pricing models for the spectrum allocation in 5G. Similar
to Section IV, this section is organized based on objectives
which the spectrum allocation mechanisms aim to achieve.
The major objectives include (i) data rate maximization for
users, (ii) revenue/profit maximization which is to maximize
the revenue/profit for network operators, i.e., MNOs, and
(iii) system utility/social welfare maximization for both the
users and the network operators, in the following subsections,
respectively. Note that the different objectives lead to the
use of different pricing models. For example, the auctions
are commonly used to maximize the revenue for the MNOs
while the Stakeleberg game is mostly adopted to maximize
the overall system utility.
A. Data Rate Maximization
This section reviews the applications of the economic and
pricing models for the spectrum/rate allocation in 5G, i.e.,
mmWave networks, massive MIMO networks, C-RANs, and
HetNets. Different pricing models can be applied to differ-
ent technologies. For example, in mmWave networks, the
mmWave band can be aggregated with existing bands, e.g.,
3G band, and then the NUM problem can be used for the rate
allocation to maximize the sum of data rates of all users. In
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TABLE IV: Applications of economic and pricing models for user association in 5G (MWN: Millimeter Wave Network, MMN:
Massive MIMO Network, HN: Heterogeneous Network).
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Solution NetworkSeller Buyer Item
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[36]
Distributed
auction
Access
points Users
Transmission
rate
Given the access points’ service prices, each user selects the best access
point. The access point selects users with higher payments.
Optimal
solution MWN
[37]
Distributed
auction Coordinator SBSs Users
Based on the demand of SBSs, the coordinator iteratively adjusts the price
of each item, i.e., each user, using the Walras’ tatonnement process.
Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium HN
[41]
Utility
maximization
MBSs
and SBSs Users Spectrum
Each user selects an MBS or an SBS, and spectrum segment. Then, the
sellers update the prices by using the projected gradient method.
Optimal
solution HN
[44]
Utility
maximization
MBSs
and SBSs Users
Spectrum
segments
Same as [41], but the dual coordinate descent method is used to update the
prices.
Optimal
solution HN
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[34]
General
pricing
Access
points Users
Transmission
rate
Given the users’ requests, the access points update service prices by using
the projected subgradient method.
Optimal
solution MWN
[47]
Utility
maximization BSs Users
Data
rates
Each user selects a set of BSs to maximize its total bang-per-buck. Then,
the BSs adjust the resource prices using the subgradient method.
Optimal
solution MMN
[49]
Congestion-
based
pricing
SBSs MUEs Bandwidth Same as [41], but the SBSs update the prices, i.e., shadow prices andcongestion prices, using the gradient descent method.
Optimal
solution HN
[51]
Congestion-
based
pricing
M2M
devices
Relay
nodes
Routing
services Relay nodes update routing prices according to the demand and supply rule.
Market
equilibrium HN
[54]
Paris metro
pricing MNOs Users
Access
services
Each user decides to access to RAT of the MNO depending on the RAT’s
access price and the user’s congestion sensitivity. Stable solution HN
[55]
Forward
auction
MBSs
and SBSs Users
Access
services
Given the users’ bids, each MBS or SBS selects the buyer with the highest
bid as the winner.
Optimal
solution HN
E
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[56]
Utility
maximization BSs Users
Data
rates
Same as [47], but the Lagrange dual theory is applied to solve the
optimization problem.
Optimal
solution MMN
[58]
Repeated
game BSs Users
Data
rates
Each user repeats the selection of its preferred BS while each BS repeats
the selection of its preferred users until the users in the waiting list of each
BS do not change anymore.
Nash
equilibrium HN
[61]
Repeated
game
Service
provider Users
Data
rates
Service provider iteratively sets prices for its BSs, and users iteratively
select BSs until both the service provider and the users are satisfied.
Nash
equilibrium HN
[62]
Cost
minimization
Relay
nodes
Source
node
Forwarding
services
Given the relay nodes’ prices, the source node determines the optimal
fractions of data for each relay node by solving the source node’s cost
minimization problem.
Optimal
solution HN
TABLE V: A summary of advantages and disadvantages of major approaches for user association in 5G.
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[37] • Achieve low computational complexity • Dot not specify the distribution function for the states
[47] • Support multiple users and multiple BSs • Require synchronized price updates across the BSs
[34] • Support multiple BSs and multiple user and have fast convergence • Require communication among BSs for price updates
[58] • Support multiple users and multiple BSs • Have high communication overhead
massive MIMO networks, antennas and spectrum can be sliced
into spatial streams which are then allocated to multiple users.
Auctions can be used for the stream allocation to maximize
the users’ data rates while guaranteeing the truthfulness.
1) MmWave networks: With the high throughput, mmWave
communications can support users’ multimedia applications
and provide wireless backhaul links between BSs. Pricing
models are developed for different network scenarios. For
example, if the users are selfish, then the non-cooperative game
can be used.
Non-cooperative game: The authors in [21] addressed the
data rate allocation for multimedia users so as to maximize
their individual application data rates. The users are selfish,
and the non-cooperative game among them is applied. The
model consists of users as players, i.e., buyers, and a network
controller as the seller. The strategy of each user is to request
data rate to maximize its utility. The utility of the players is a
function of the allocated data rate and the price offered by the
controller. Generally, if there are few users competing for the
available resource, the price is low. Otherwise, there is high
competition between the users, and the price for requesting
high data rate is increased. This results in decrease of the
users’ utilities. The desired outcome of the game is the Nash
equilibrium in terms of the optimal data rates of the users.
However, there is no method for checking and proving the
existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for this
proposed scheme.
In fact, the bargaining game [64] can be used for a fair
data rate allocation. The bargaining game allocates data rates
optimally to users so as to maximize the product of the users’
utilities. However, this game requires the users to cooperate
with each other which may be hard to achieve in practice.
Utility maximization: To achieve larger spectrum band-
width, the mmWave band, e.g., 38 GHz, can be aggregated
with existing bands, e.g., 3G band and 4G band. In this
context, the authors in [33] investigated the aggregated carrier
allocation to users to maximize their rates. The model consists
of one BS and multiple users. First, the users as buyers
submit their data rate requests to maximize their utilities. Then,
the BS as the seller determines user groups, each of which
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Fig. 7: Matching between Demanding BSs (D-BSs) and Anchored
BSs (A-BSs) for Backhaul Resource Blocks (BRBs).
is a set of users located in the coverage area of a carrier.
The BS allocates the aggregated carriers to user groups in
a descending order of the carrier frequencies. Specifically,
the BS formulates the resource allocation of each carrier to
the user group as the NUM problem. In the problem, the
utility of each user is represented by the logarithm of the
sigmoidal-like utility function of the total aggregated rate
obtained from the allocated carriers. This function is strictly
concave, and the globally optimal solution is obtained using
the Lagrange method with the multiplier as the bandwidth
price that the users pay the BS for receiving the rate. The
simulation results show that the proposed scheme always
converges to the optimal rates given the different available
resources of carriers. Moreover, when the available resource
of each carrier is low, the resource price paid by the users is
high. The pricing strategy thus regulates user’s demand and
improves network resource efficiency.
Matching game: The mmWave communications can pro-
vide wireless backhaul links between BSs as shown in Fig. 7.
In this network model, the Demanding BSs (D-BSs) are
connected to the core network via the Anchored BSs (A-BSs).
Thus to serve their users, the D-BSs as buyers need to buy
mmWave spectrum in terms of Backhaul Resource Blocks
(BRBs) from the A-BSs serving as the sellers. The problem is
to determine the number of BRBs of the A-BSs for each D-BS
to minimize the D-BS’s total cost while meeting the data rate
requirements for the D-BS’s users.
In such a multi-seller multi-buyer scenario, the matching
game [65] is used to solve the problem as proposed in [66].
First, each A-BS sets prices for its BRBs. Then, each D-BS
ranks all BRBs in a descending order of utilities obtained from
receiving BRBs. Here, the utility is the difference between the
achievable rate and the BRB price. The D-BS selects for its
preferred BRBs with the highest utilities. At each A-BS, if a
preferred BRB receives more than one request from D-BSs,
the A-BS selects the D-BS which maximizes the preferred
BRB’s utility as the winner. When the selected D-BS receives
more BRBs, its aggregated rate and total cost also increase
accordingly. This process is repeated until for every D-BS,
either its aggregated rate is larger than its demand or its total
cost is larger than its budget. The simulation results show that
the proposed scheme can improve the average rate around 30%
compared with the best-effort approach adopted from [67].
However, the complexity of the proposed scheme is higher,
especially when the number of D-BSs or BRBs is large.
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Fig. 8: Spatial stream allocation based on auction schemes in a
massive MIMO network.
2) Massive MIMO networks: In massive MIMO networks,
physical resources of BSs such as antennas and spectrum can
be sliced into spatial streams using the spatial multiplexing.
In this context, the authors in [68] addressed the allocation of
spatial streams of one MNO to others MNOs, called Mobile
Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), to maximize the data
rates for the MVNOs. To incentivize the MVNOs to submit
their actual valuation, the VCG auction is used. The model
is shown in Fig. 8 in which the MNO is the seller and the
MVNOs are the bidders. First, based on the number of its
users, the MVNO computes a bid, i.e., the number of spatial
streams to maximize its utility, i.e., the difference between the
value and the price that the MVNO pays the MNO. Here, the
value is proportional to the average achievable rate, and the
price information is taken from the last auction. The winners
and the payments are then determined according to the VCG
auction. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme
improves significantly the average data rate compared with
the equally-divided spectrum allocation. However, compared
with the optimal assignment, the proposed scheme has a slight
performance loss because of the inaccurate estimate of the
stream price that is taken from the last auction. Learning
algorithms can be used to improve the performance.
3) C-RANs: The C-RANs have the constraint on the fron-
thaul capacity. Subject to this constraint, the authors in [69]
formulated an optimization problem which determines the
transmission rates and the numbers of quantization data bits
for all users to maximize the total transmission rate. In this
model, the users as buyers consume the fronthaul bandwidth
and cloud resources of a cloud provider serving as the seller.
The optimization problem is a non-linear integer problem,
and a pricing parameter is introduced. The pricing parameter
is actually the price of fronthaul bandwidth that the users
pay the cloud provider. On one hand, the pricing parameter
incentivizes the users to efficiently utilize resources. On the
other hand, by updating the pricing parameter iteratively based
on the binary searching method, the optimization problem is
divided into independent subproblems which can be locally
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Fig. 9: Rate allocation for M2M applications based on auction.
solved by the RRHs. The optimal transmission rates for
the users are achieved by applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) condition and the Lagrangian method. However, when
the cloud resource is too low, the optimization problem in the
proposed scheme may be infeasible.
4) HetNets: Rate maximization is also a major requirement
in HetNets, especially in M2M networks which provide emer-
gency services, e.g., road accident warning, with low latency.
Economic and pricing models can provide rate allocation
schemes to maximize the total rate of the M2M services under
the network constraints.
Utility maximization: Such an approach can be found in
[70] which adopts the NUM problem to allocate data rates
from an MBS as a seller to M2M services as buyers. The
NUM problem is essentially similar to the utility maximiza-
tion problem as discussed in the previous approaches, e.g.,
[33]. However, the utility of each M2M service is calculated
proportionally to the delay and the price that the M2M service
must pay for the allocated rate. Therefore, the optimization
problem is to minimize the sum of utility functions. By using
the second derivative, the objective utility function is proved to
be concave, and there is a unique optimal solution for the rate
allocation and the price. However, using the Newton’s method
to obtain the optimal solution can result in slow convergence.
VCG auction: In practice, different M2M applications may
have different valuations of allocated data rates on the same
period. For example, at the traffic peak hours, the valuation
of an M2M application in a vehicular network may be much
higher than that of an M2M application to monitor environ-
ments. The auction schemes can be adopted to allocate the
data rates to the M2M applications with the highest valuations.
The approach based on the VCG auction is presented in
[71]. The model is shown in Fig. 9 in which each M2M
application as a buyer submits its bid to an MBS serving
as an auctioneer. The bid includes parameters such as the
M2M application’s valuation, data rate requirement, and the
price that the application is willing to pay. The MBS selects
the winners that maximize the social welfare and charges
each winner according to the VCG payment strategy for a
truth-telling valuation report. The simulation results show that
the transmission success probability can reach up to 97%.
However, the assumption that the data rate of each M2M
application is constant in each time slot is not so realistic.
To improve further the transmission success probability
of the M2M applications, their data rate demands should
be predicted. The authors in [72] introduced an estimation
stage through the maximum likelihood method before con-
ducting the VCG auction. The simulation results show that
the transmission success probability can reach up to 99%, i.e.,
improved by additionally 2% compared with that in [71].
Option pricing: The M2M applications can reserve data
rates by using the option pricing [73] as proposed in [74].
In the scheme, each M2M application as a buyer reserves
the resource, i.e., data rate, at a pre-specified price and a
pre-defined time via a call option contract. The contract will
protect the buyer against a higher resource price in the future,
and also provide for the buyer the right to purchase the
requested data rate even when the buyer loses in the current
auction round. Moreover, a convex cost function is introduced
which allows the buyers to choose the strike price, i.e., the
price at which the call option can be exercised, to minimize
their reservation costs while obtaining the QoS in terms of
guaranteed data rate. Under the proposed scheme, the data
rates can be allocated to the M2M applications with the
maximum utilization. The Vickrey auction is then applied for
the rate allocation to achieve the truthfulness.
B. Revenue Maximization
To stimulate network operators to share spectrum, improv-
ing their revenue is a major motivation of the spectrum
management. This subsection discusses the applications of
economic and pricing models for the spectrum management
to maximize the network operators’ revenue in 5G. Different
economic and pricing models can be applied to different
technologies, e.g., mmWave, massive MIMO, and HetNets.
For example, in mmWave networks which have the large
bandwidth to serve a number of users, the economic terms
“network size” or “network effect” are introduced to improve
and quantify the revenue of the network operators. In massive
MIMO networks, auctions are adopted to allocate the bundle
of spectrum and antennas to enhance the resource efficiency
while guaranteeing the highest revenue of the network opera-
tors.
1) MmWave networks: Economic and pricing approaches
for the mmWave spectrum sharing between the network oper-
ators are reviewed in this section.
General pricing: The authors in [75] addressed the issue
of mmWave spectrum sharing between a Primary Operator
(PO) and a Secondary Operator (SO). The PO which owns an
exclusive-use license of a certain spectrum band sells a license
of the same band to the SO under a certain restriction. The
restriction means that the SO’s network serves its users without
violating an interference threshold at the PO’s network. The
SO pays the PO a license price which is linear in the sum
rate that the SO receives. Note that this sum rate depends
on the interference threshold set by the PO. Increasing the
threshold allows the SO’s network to increase its sum rate,
but this also decreases the sum rate of the PO’s network. In
this case, theoretically, the revenue of the PO decreases due to
the reduction of the sum rate for its own users. However, the
simulation results show that the PO’s revenue does not always
decrease with an increase in the threshold. The reason can be
that the payment which the PO receives from the SO is more
than that the PO loses from its own users. The simulation
results also show that there exists an interference threshold
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that maximizes the PO’s revenue, meaning that the PO has
an incentive to share its spectrum. However, a general system
model with multiple POs and SOs needs to be investigated.
Non-cooperative game: Similar to [75], the authors in
[76] considered mmWave spectrum sharing between the two
Service Providers (SPs). The objective is to quantify the SPs’
profits with or without sharing the spectrum. Here, each SP’s
profit is a function of the number of its users, i.e., the network
size, the service quality level that the SP chooses, and the price
that the SP sets. In particular, the network size is determined
by introducing a so-called network effect into the utility of
each user. The SPs are competitive, and the non-cooperative
game is adopted in which the SPs simultaneously set prices
and choose service quality levels to maximize their profits. It
is proved that if the ratio of service quality levels between the
two SPs is larger than a certain threshold, there is a unique
Nash equilibrium of the game at which both SPs set prices
higher than their marginal costs and earn a non-zero profit.
The profits of the SPs at the Nash equilibrium are finally
determined. The simulation results show that the SPs’ profits
with spectrum sharing are significantly improved compared
with those of the case without the sharing. However, in the real
competitive markets, the SP which chooses the high service
level may prefer to share spectrum only when the intensity of
the network effect is small.
2) Massive MIMO networks: In massive MIMO networks,
the MNO trades both spectrum and antennas of a BS as a
bundle to the users to satisfy their dynamic QoS requirements.
Auctions allow the users to express preferences over bundles
of physical resources, i.e., the spectrum and antennas, while
guaranteeing the highest revenue for the MNO.
Ascending Clock Auction (ACA): The ACA as presented
in Section III-C3 is often used for the resource allocation
due to its simplicity which allows bidders to quickly discover
the resource prices in complex markets. The authors in [31]
adopted the ACA for the allocation of the resource bundles.
The model is shown in Fig. 8 which includes one MNO as
the seller, multiple MVNOs as bidders, and one auctioneer.
First, the auctioneer broadcasts the spectrum price and the
antenna price to the MVNOs. Given the prices, the MVNOs
determine and submit their bids to the auctioneer. Each bid of
an MVNO includes the amount of spectrum and the number
of antennas that satisfy a minimum rate requirement of its
users while minimizing the cost. At the auctioneer, if there
is an excess demand for the spectrum in the current round,
the auctioneer increases the posted spectrum price in the next
round. This process is repeated until the spectrum supply
equals the spectrum demand. The auctioneer then selects bids
through formulating and solving the WDP in which bids are
selected so as to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue. The
simulation results show that a lower antenna price leads to
the higher overall revenue from selling the spectrum. The
reason is from the complementarity of the antennas and the
spectrum. In particular, a low antenna price leads to the
increase of the spectrum demand and the revenue. However,
the proposed scheme has high computational complexity due
to the complexity of the branch-on-bids algorithm in the WDP.
The ACA approach can also be found in [77], but the
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Fig. 10: Tiered pricing-based channel allocation in C-RANs.
spectrum is channelized into blocks each with 5MHz to be
compatible with the existing standards, e.g., the 4G LTE.
Moreover, the Licensed Shared Access (LSA) is used to
improve the spectrum utilization for the MVNOs. The LSA
is the European spectrum-sharing framework which allows
MVNOs as LSA licensees to share the allocated spectrum
with the MVNOs’ users, called incumbents, on an exclusive
basis [78]. This means that each MVNO has the rights to
access the spectrum that is unused by an incumbent at certain
locations and times. The information about the spectrum and
its use by the incumbent is updated by the LSA repository. The
ACA approach from [31] is then applied to assign bundles of
resources, i.e., the numbers of antennas and blocks, to the
MVNOs.
Utility maximization: To gain revenue for the MNO and to
reduce the payments of the users, the presence of the MVNOs
which are the intermediaries may not be required. The MNO
can thus allocate directly bundles of physical resources at
each massive MIMO BS to the users as proposed in [79].
The users are first divided into groups, each of which has
a minimum required rate. To maximize the total utility of
user groups, the NUM problem is formulated. Each group’s
utility is the difference between the total achievable rate of
users in the group and the total price that the users in the
group pay the MNO for receiving the resource bundles. The
problem is then solved by applying the Lagrange multiplier
method and the KKT conditions. In particular, the power and
the number of antennas allocated to each user in each iteration
is inversely proportional to the power price and the antenna
price, respectively. The simulation results show that when
these prices increase, the total rate decreases. Moreover, the
effect of increasing the antenna price is more considerable
than that of the power price. The reason is that in the massive
MIMO network, the maximum allowable number of allocated
antennas for each user can be much larger than that of allowed
power units for the user.
3) C-RAN: A large number of RRHs are deployed in the C-
RAN, and the load balancing among the RRHs is an important
requirement in addition to the revenue maximization of the
MNOs. Pricing models such as tiered pricing can be used to
meet both requirements.
Tiered pricing: The authors in [80] adopted the tiered
pricing for the spectrum, i.e., channel, allocation in the C-
RAN as shown in Fig. 10. First, the users as buyers send their
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QoS requirements to the MNO as the seller. Based on the QoS
information received, the MNO determines the prices and then
the channel allocation for the users to maximize its revenue.
Here, the price is set using a piecewise function [18] in which
the price for the user is low/high if the user requires a range of
low/high data rates. This results in a balanced resource alloca-
tion among the users. The Increment-Based Greedy Allocation
(IBGA) [81] is then applied to allocate the channels to the
RRHs one by one. Specifically, in each iteration, the MNO
assigns the channel to the RRH which provides the highest
increment of revenue. The allocation of the channel continues
until no more RRH can use it. Afterwards, the user association
issue for each RRH is addressed based on the minimum rate
guarantee for the RRH’s users. The simulation results show
that the proposed scheme can achieve the same performance
as the standard high-complexity scheme, i.e., the branch and
bound method [82], in terms of system throughput. However,
how the MNO’s revenue improves is not demonstrated.
Knapsack problem: To satisfy the processing demands of
a massive number of users, multiple clouds can be deployed
for the C-RAN. The problem is how to assign users to the
clouds to maximize the profits of cloud providers. To solve
the problem, the authors in [83] adopted the knapsack problem
[84], i.e., a combinatorial optimization for efficiently allocating
resources, e.g., spectrum or cloud, to users given the cost
budget. Each cloud provider pays its users penalty costs if
the QoS performance cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, the
net profit function of the cloud provider serving a user is
the difference between the price that the user pays and the
penalty cost. The optimization problem is then solved by using
the full polynomial time approximation scheme [85] to find
an optimal set of users for the cloud provider. In practice,
the cloud provider can increase the penalty cost for attracting
more users and iteratively execute the algorithm to find a new
optimal set of users. Some users in the previous optimal set
may remain in the new one. These users show their mutual
interests in the cloud provider. Thus the cloud provider may
set the penalty costs for them to zero before executing again
the algorithm to maximize its net profit. However, the high
computational complexity is incurred.
4) HetNets: A HetNet consists of multiple tiers, and one
of the important issues is how to allocate the spectrum to the
tiers to maximize the MNOs’ revenue. Pricing models based
on game theory and auctions are used to make appropriate
investment decisions for the MNOs.
General game: A two-stage game for the spectrum alloca-
tion in the HetNet can be found in [86]. The network model is
shown in Fig. 11 which involves multiple MNOs as sellers and
multiple users as buyers. Each MNO owns one MBS and one
SBS. For each MNO, the first stage of the game determines
the amount of bandwidth for trading at its MBS and SBS, and
the second stage determines access prices for the MBS and
SBS to maximize the MNO’s revenue. Given the access prices,
each user selects the MNO to maximize the user’s utility, i.e.,
the valuation of its achievable rate minus the access price.
The access prices are iteratively adjusted by the MNOs so
that the total demand equals the total supply. The simulation
results with two MNOs show that with limited bandwidth, both
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Fig. 11: Pricing approaches for spectrum allocation in HetNets
MNOs only allocate bandwidth to SBSs. The reason is that
when the bandwidth is limited, the access prices charged to
MBSs and SBSs are very high. The MNOs would thus invest
all bandwidth to the SBSs which may result in more data rate
and hence higher revenue. However, when the MNOs have
more bandwidth, investing only in SBSs would significantly
decrease the access prices for the SBSs and reduce revenue
of the MNOs. Thus the MNOs will invest the bandwidth to
both MBSs and SBSs. These results are useful for network
operators to make appropriate investment decisions. However,
how to adjust the access prices as well as to prove the existence
of equilibriums of the game is not specified.
Forward auction: When one MNO decides to allocate
the bandwidth to multiple SBSs, the forward auction can be
adopted to enable the MNO to achieve the highest revenue
as proposed in [87]. In this model, one MNO is seller,
i.e., the auctioneer, and multiple Femto Holders (FHs) which
own SBSs are buyers. Based on bandwidth requests of its
subscribers, each FH calculates the bandwidth demand and
the rental price to maximize its utility, i.e., profit. The FHs
then submit the information of bandwidth demands and rental
prices to the MNO. Based on the information, the MNO
determines the winning FHs which maximize its revenue by
solving the knapsack problem. Assume that the FHs submit the
same rental price, the simulation results show that there exists
a rental price at which their profit is maximized. However, the
profit maximization may not be held in the long term since
the MNO as the monopolist can re-determine the winners to
maximize its own revenue rather than the FHs’ profit.
To gain more revenue, the MNO can also trade unused
spectrum to D2D users. In this context, the authors in [88]
applied the forward auction with multiple rounds for the
spectrum sharing between the MNO, i.e., the seller, and the
D2D users, i.e., the bidders. In each round, each D2D user
submits its bid to specify the amount of bandwidth, the sub-
band, and the price that the D2D user is willing to pay.
The D2D user with the highest price is the winner. This
process is repeated until all bandwidth is sold. To minimize the
interference caused by the D2D users, the MNO also allocates
a transmit power on each sub-band when allocating the sub-
band to each D2D user.
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Different from [88], the authors in [89] considered the
spectrum allocation for the M2M networks which will support
a large number of M2M devices. This may create a significant
congestion at the radio access of the MBSs. Thus the conges-
tion problem should be considered in addition to the revenue.
The congestion-based pricing can be adopted to address the
problem. The model consists of one MBS as a seller which
allocates access channels to the M2M users as buyers. The
MBS adjusts the access price based on the channel status, i.e.,
underutilized or overutilized, in the previous access period.
Generally, the step sizes for adjusting price in different access
periods may not be fixed to avoid the fluctuations of the
channel utilization. For example, if the channel is found to
be underutilized in two consecutive access periods, the MBS
increases the price by a fixed step size. If the channel is
overutilized in the previous period but underutilized in the
current period, the step size is reduced to its half to prevent
instability. Such a pricing scheme alleviates the congestion
as well as the low access delay for the users. However, the
revenue maximization for the MBS may not be guaranteed.
Instead of addressing the congestion problem, the authors
in [90] sets the access price in each period to maximize the
MBS’s total revenue. The total revenue is determined based
on the probability of successful access of each user and the
access price. The simulation results show that the pricing
scheme proposed in [90] improves the MBS’s revenue up 50%
compared with that in [89].
In addition to the SBSs and D2D/M2M users, the relay
nodes are deployed in HetNets to improve the coverage at
cell edges of the network. The authors in [91] adopted the
forward auction to allocate the spectrum of one MBS to the
relay nodes. In this model, the relay nodes are the bidders, the
MBS is the seller, and a controller is the auctioneer. The relay
nodes submit their bids to the controller. Each bid specifies the
number of RBs that the relay node requests and the price that
the user is willing to pay the MBS. Upon receiving the bids,
the controller determines the winners via calculating the ratio
of the price to the number of requested RBs of each bidder.
The bidder with the highest ratio is selected as the winner, and
the winner selection for the remaining unallocated bidders is
repeated until there is no RB at the MBS. Such a winner
selection process guarantees the highest revenue for the MNO
and resource efficiency. Then, using a binary search algorithm,
the controller calculates critical prices that the winners pay
the MBS. Since the critical price is less than its bidding price,
the proposed scheme guarantees the truthfulness. However, the
interferences between the MBS-relay link and the relay-user
link because of using the in-band relaying solution are not
considered in the proposed scheme.
C. System Utility Maximization
The aforementioned sections, i.e., Sections V-A and V-B,
discuss the applications of the economic and pricing models
for the spectrum allocation to improve either data rates for the
users or revenue for the network operators. To incentivize both
the users and the network operators to participate in a resource
market, their utilities, e.g., in terms of data rates and revenue,
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Fig. 12: Spectrum allocation in an ultra-dense small cell network
based on hierarchical game.
need to be simultaneously improved. Given the rationality of
stakeholders in 5G, economic and pricing models can handle
efficiently the conflicting objectives of all stakeholders while
minimizing the information exchange. This section reviews the
applications of economic and pricing models for the spectrum
allocation for the system utility maximization. Here, the system
utility maximization refers to maximizing the utilities of
stakeholders or the sum of their utilities, i.e., the social welfare.
1) HetNets: The authors in [92] adopted a two-level game
to maximize the utilities of stakeholders in a HetNet. As shown
in Fig. 12, the SPs lease spectrum at SBSs owned by one MNO
to provide network services to the SPs’ users. The two-level
game is based on the Stackelberg game described as follows.
In the lower-level game, the SPs are the leaders, and the
users are the followers. Each user chooses a service from an SP
to maximize the user’s utility, and then the SP autonomously
sets prices for its services so as to maximize its utility, i.e.,
its profit. Note that due to a large number of users, modeling
the strategic interaction among individual users is not feasible.
Thus the competition among users is modeled as a non-atomic
game [93], and the SPs’ competition is modeled as a non-
cooperative game. The equilibrium solution for the users is
obtained by applying the Krasnoselskii algorithm [94], and that
for the SPs is obtained as the Nash equilibrium. In the upper-
level game, the Stackelberg game is used again with the MNO
as the leader and the SPs as the followers. Based on the MNO’s
spectrum prices and users’ service requests, the SPs decide
spectrum leasing policies to maximize their own utilities.
Given the leasing decisions of SPs, the MNO determines
the spectrum prices to maximize its utility, i.e., profit. The
optimal strategies of the SPs and the MNO constitute the
Stackelberg equilibrium. This is the first work that investigates
the interactions among the users, SPs, and MNO jointly. The
case with multiple MNOs needs to be considered in the future
work. However, it is challenging to prove the convexity of the
SPs’ best responses in such a case.
Similar to [92], the authors in [95] adopted the Stackelberg
game to maximize the utilities of stakeholders in a multi-tier
HetNet. The stakeholders includes one FH as a seller and two
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Fig. 13: Stackelberg game-based spectrum allocation in HetNets.
competitive network operators, i.e., the MNO and MVNO, as
buyers. The FH owns multiple SBSs which provide RBs to
the users of the MNO and MVNO. Before the Stackelberg
game is implemented, a reverse auction is applied which
allows the network operators to select the SBSs with the
lowest payment. Since some SBSs may be selected by both the
network operators, the Stackelberg game is used to allocate the
RBs at the selected SBSs to the network operators. Here, the
network operators are the leaders, and the FH is the follower.
First, the leaders determine the prices that they pay the FH
to maximize the leaders’ profits. Then, the FH determines
the number of the RBs at the selected SBSs for each leader
to maximize the FH’s utility, i.e., revenue. The simulation
results show that the total utility of stakeholders, i.e., the
network operators and the FH, of the proposed scheme is much
higher than that of the scheme without sharing the resources.
Additionally, the total price that the network operators pay the
FH decreases when the SBS density is high. The reason is due
to the high competition among the SBSs. However, this may
not be an important issue in practice because SBSs owned by
the same FH do not compete with each other.
The Stackelberg game can be used to maximize the utilities
of MNOs and users in a multi-RAT environment of the
HetNets as proposed in [96]. The model is shown in Fig. 13
in which the MNOs are the leaders, and the users are the
followers. Each MNO as a seller owns multiple RATs, and
each user as a buyer can access simultaneously to more
than one RAT. Given MNOs’ bandwidth prices, each user
determines the amount of bandwidth of the chosen RATs
to maximize its own utility. The Lagrange function and the
projected gradient method are applied to achieve the optimal
solutions for the users. Given the users’ best responses, the
MNOs compete with each other on the bandwidth prices to
maximize their utilities, i.e., revenues. The optimal prices for
each MNO is obtained by taking the first derivative of its
utility function. The simulation results show that the utility of
the MNO raises as it increases the bandwidth price. However,
when the price is too high, the MNO’s revenue decreases since
the users tend to access the RATs of other MNOs. In fact, the
competition level among the MNOs may vary in different areas
depending on the number of MNOs in the areas, which can
be taken into account in the future work.
Different from [96], the users in [97] are assumed to
cooperate with each other. Accordingly, given the bandwidth
prices of the MNO, the users determine their optimal data
rates to maximize the sum of their utilities. The problem of the
users is proved to be convex, and the Lagrange function and
the KKT conditions are applied to find optimal solutions for
the users. Given the optimal data rates, the MNO determines
bandwidth prices for the RATs to maximize its utility, i.e.,
revenue, using the greedy pricing algorithm [98]. This pricing
strategy aims to maximize the social welfare while ensuring
that all participants make non-negative profit. However, the
computational time for finding the optimal prices depends
heavily on the number of RATs, and it can be unacceptably
long with many RATs in the network.
2) C-RAN: C-RANs often have limited fronthaul band-
width, and the problem is how one MNO (i) selects users/SPs
which value the resource the most and (ii) allocates the
resource to them to achieve the highest social welfare. The
VCG auction is used to solve the problem as proposed in [27].
First, each SP, i.e., a bidder, submits a bid to the MNO, i.e., the
auctioneer. The bid specifies the price that the SP is willing to
pay and the certain amount of resources, i.e., the spectrum
at RRHs and the fronthaul bandwidth. Upon receiving the
bids, the MNO formulates the WDP to maximize the total
utility of the MNO and the SPs. The MNO’s utility is its total
payment, and the SP’s utility is the difference between the
true valuation of its selected price and its actual payment. The
WDP is solved by the decomposition technique in [99], and
the prices charged to the winners are determined based on the
VCG payment policy. The simulation results show that the
proposed scheme outperforms the greedy algorithm in terms
of social welfare. Moreover, the social welfare increases as the
number of winners and the capacity ratio are large. However,
the large capacity ratio results in reduced revenue of the MNO
due to abundant resources in the C-RAN system.
After receiving the resources from the MNO, the SPs
allocate them to users. This is a hierarchical model with two
levels as shown in Fig. 12. In this scenario, the authors in [100]
adopted two auction schemes at the two levels for Resource
Block (RB) allocation. Generally, the higher-level auction uses
the share auction [101] which allocates the RBs of the MNO to
the SPs by using the proportional fair allocation. Accordingly,
the number of RBs that one SP receives is proportional to the
price that the SP is willing to pay. Then, each SP allocates
the RBs to its own users using the VCG auction. The greedy
algorithm is applied to determine the winning users and the
corresponding prices that the users pay. Using the greedy
algorithm and the share auction enables the lower- and higher-
level auctions to achieve the high computational efficiency.
However, as shown in the simulation results, the uniqueness
of the equilibrium in the higher-level auction is not always
guaranteed due to the lack of concavity of the utility, i.e.,
profit, function of the SPs.
3) Massive MIMO networks: In massive MIMO networks,
the combinatorial auction is efficiently used to allocate a
bundle of resources, i.e., antennas and spectrum, to users. To
maximize the social welfare, the combinatorial auction can be
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combined with the VCG payment policy.
Combinatorial auction: The integration of the two ap-
proaches, i.e., the combinatorial auction and the VCG auction,
can be found in [30]. The network model consists of one
MNO, multiple MVNOs, and multiple users. The auction is
implemented in two levels as shown in Fig. 8. In the upper
level, each MVNO as a bidder submits a bid including a
bundle of subchannels and antennas as well as its valuation
to the MNO. The MNO determines the winning bidders so
as to maximize the sum of bids. The dynamic programming
algorithm [102] is applied to obtain an optimal solution. After
receiving the resources from the MNO, in the lower level,
each MVNO as the auctioneer executes the combinatorial
auction to allocate bundles of resources to the MVNO’s users,
i.e., bidders. The process of the combinatorial auction is
similar to that in the upper level. The VCG payment policy
is adopted in both levels to charge the winning bidders. The
simulation results show that the proposed scheme outperforms
the fixed sharing scheme in terms of social welfare and
average subchannel utilization. However, using the dynamic
programing algorithm leads to high computational complexity.
Lower complexity algorithms such as the polynomial-time
greedy algorithm [103] can be used. However, the greedy
algorithm only achieves an approximate optimal solution based
on which the VCG payment policy will be no longer incentive
compatible.
Double auction: When there are multiple MNOs, the
double auction can be used as proposed in [104]. In this model,
the MNOs as sellers sell data rates to MVNOs as buyers.
Different from the classical double auction as presented in
Section III-C4, the deal price of each seller-buyer pair is a
pre-negotiated price between them. The problem is to find
optimal data rates requested by the MVNOs and those offered
by the MNOs to maximize the social welfare. First, the KKT
conditions are applied to the problem to obtain the optimal
dual variables, called shadow prices. The shadow prices ensure
the desirable economic properties as well as the total welfare.
Based on the shadow prices and the pre-negotiated prices, each
MVNO determines an optimal data rate for each of its user,
and each MNO also calculates the optimal data rate that it
offers to the user. The MNOs and MVNOs then submit their
asks and bids including the optimal data rates to a broker, i.e.,
a Software-Defined Networking (SDN) controller. The broker
checks some convergence conditions, e.g., the requested data
rate is less than the offered data rate. If the conditions are
not satisfied, the broker updates the shadow prices using the
subgradient descent method, and subsequently the MVNOs
and the MNOs update and submit again their bids/asks.
This process is repeated until the convergence conditions are
met. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme
outperforms the random allocation in terms of social welfare.
However, how to determine the pre-negotiated prices for seller-
buyer pairs is not explained, which is practically challenging
in the large-scale 5G.
Summary: In this section, we have discussed the appli-
cations of economic and pricing models for the spectrum
allocation in 5G. The objective is to maximize the spec-
trum efficiency, revenue, and the total system utility. The
reviewed approaches are summarized along with the references
in Table VI. Furthermore, a summary of advantages and
disadvantages of major approaches is given in Table VII. We
observe that the different objectives lead to the use of different
pricing models. For example, the auctions are commonly used
to maximize the revenue while the Stakeleberg game is mostly
adopted to maximize the overall system utility. Given the ultra-
dense BS deployment, the interference mitigation is also a
major requirement of 5G. The next section discusses how to
apply the economic and pricing models for power management
in 5G to mitigate the interference while guaranteeing the QoS.
VI. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR INTERFERENCE AND POWER MANAGEMENT
Due to the ultra-dense deployment of heterogeneous BSs
and devices, one of the biggest challenges of power man-
agement in 5G is to minimize inter-cell and inter/intra-tier
interferences. The optimization methods for power control in
conventional radio networks such as fractional programming
[105] usually require centralized controllers. This leads to
substantial signaling and computational overhead to 5G. Al-
ternatively, economic and pricing models can be used in the
power management to mitigate interference with low compu-
tational complexity while improving revenue. For example,
simply setting appropriate prices according to the interference
levels was shown to achieve decent outcomes with minimal
overhead. This section thus discusses applications of economic
and pricing models for power management. Specifically, sub-
section VI-A reviews economic and pricing approaches to
mitigate interference, and subsection VI-B reviews economic
and pricing approaches to minimize power consumption cost.
A. Interference Mitigation
In this section, the economic and pricing approaches for the
interference mitigation in HetNets are reviewed. The common
idea is that each BS measures locally the interference levels
caused by its neighboring BSs. Based on the interference
levels, the BS charges prices to the neighboring BSs. The
neighboring BSs then adjust their transmit power correspond-
ingly. The actions, i.e., setting the price and adjusting the
transmit power, are done sequentially, and thus the Stackelberg
game is commonly used.
1) Stackelberg game: The first work can be found in
[24] which adopted the Stackelberg game for interference
management in a multi-tier HetNet. The network model is
shown in Fig. 14 in which the MBS is the leader, and UEs
of femtocells, i.e., FUEs, are the followers. Initially, the MBS
sets interference prices as penalty costs that the FUEs pay for
causing interferences to users of the MBS [106]. Based on the
prices, each FUE determines its transmit power to maximize
its utility. The optimization problem of the FUE is convex, and
KKT conditions are applied to obtain the optimal power. Given
the optimal power, the MBS determines optimal interference
prices to maximize its utility, i.e., its payment. The problem
of the MBS is also convex, and the Lagrange method and the
complementary slackness condition are adopted to determine
the optimal prices. Generally, the price charged to each FUE
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TABLE VI: Applications of economic and pricing models for spectrum allocation in 5G (MWN: Millimeter Wave Network,
CRAN: Cloud-Radio Access Network, MMN: Massive MIMO Network, HN: Heterogeneous Network).
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Solution NetworkSeller Buyer Item
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[33]
Utility
maximization BS Users
Aggregated
carriers
The rate allocation problem is formulated as the NUM problem. The
global optimal solution is obtained by applying the Lagrange method.
Optimal
solution MWN
[21]
Non-
cooperative
game
Network
controller Users
Transmission
rate
Given the resource price offered by the network controller, the Nash
equilibrium transmissions rates for the users are determined.
Nash
equilibrium MWN
[66]
Matching
theory
Anchored-
BSs
Demanding-
BSs
Backhaul
resource
blocks
Given resource prices offered by the anchored-BSs, a two-sided
assignment scheme is applied to assign each anchored-BS to each
demanding-BS.
Competitive
equilibrium MWN
[68] VCG auction MNO MVNOs
Spatial
streams
MVNOs compute demands and submits it to the MNO. The MNO
selects the winners and charges them according to the VCG auction.
Bayesian Nash
equilibrium MMN
[69]
General
pricing
Cloud
provider Users
Fronthaul
bandwidth
and cloud
resources
The optimal transmissions rates for the users are determined by using
the penalty method, binary searching method, and KKT condition.
Optimal
solution CRAN
[70]
Utility
maximization MBS
M2M
services Data rates
The optimal transmission rates and price for the services are
determined by applying the Newton’s method.
Optimal
solution HN
[71] VCG auction MBS
M2M ap-
plications Data rates
The winners and their charges are determined based on the VCG
auction.
Bayesian Nash
equilibrium HN
[74]
Vicrkey
auction and
option
pricing
MBS M2M ap-plications Data rates
M2M applications reverse data rates via the option pricing and
Vicrey auction is adopted for the rate allocation.
Nash
equilibrium HN
R
ev
en
ue
m
ax
im
iz
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io
n
[75]
General
pricing
Primary
operator
Secondary
operator Spectrum
Secondary operator receives the sum rate from primary operator and
pays the primary operator a price which is linear in the sum rate.
Optimal
solution MMW
[76]
General
pricing
Service
providers Users Spectrum
Service providers quantify their profits based on the network effect,
the users’ willingness to pay, the price and the inherent quality
offered by the service providers.
Nash
equilibrium MMW
[31]
Ascending
clock auction MNO MVNOs
Spectrum
and
antennas
MVNOs submit their bids for the resources. The MNO adjusts the
resource prices according to the law of supply and demand. The
winner selection problem is then solved by using the branch-on-bids.
Walrasian
equilibrium MMN
[77]
Ascending
clock auction MNO MVNOs
Spectrum
and
antennas
Same as [31], but the LSA framework is used to allow the MVNOs
to access the spectrum that is unused by their users.
Walrasian
equilibrium MMN
[79]
General
pricing MNO Users
Sub-
carrier and
antennas
Users are divided into groups, and the problem is to maximize the
total utility of all groups. The Lagrange multiplier and the KKT
conditions are applied to solve the problem.
Optimal
solution MMN
[80]
Piecewise
function-
based
pricing
MNO Users Channels
MNO sets prices for users using the piecewise function. Then, the
MNO formulates its revenue maximization problem which is solved
by the IBGA algorithm.
Optimal
solution CRAN
[87]
Forward
auction MNO FHs
Resource
blocks
MNO determines the winning FHs by solving the knapsack problem.
Then, the winners pay the MNO the submitted prices.
Optimal
solution HN
[88]
Forward
auction MNO
D2D
users Bandwidth
The MNO selects the D2D user with the highest bid as the winner.
This process is repeated for the remaining D2D users until all
bandwidth is sold.
Optimal
solution HN
[90]
General
pricing MBS
M2M
users
Access
channels MBS sets an access price so as to maximize its revenue.
Optimal
solution HN
[91]
Forward
auction MBS
Relay
nodes
Resource
blocks
Winning relay nodes are determined based on their bids. Then, the
binary search algorithm is used to determine the charges for the
winners.
Optimal
solution HN
Sy
st
em
ut
ili
ty
m
ax
im
iz
at
io
n
[92]
Hierarchical
game MNO
Service
providers
and users
Network
services
and
spectrum
The Stackelberg game at the lower-level game determines the optimal
service prices for the service providers and the optimal service
selections for the users. The Stackelberg game at the upper-level
game determines the optimal spectrum leasing policies for the
service providers and the optimal spectrum prices for the MNO.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[95]
Stackelberg
game FH
MNO
and
MVNO
Resource
blocks
Each buyer, i.e., MNO or MVNO, selects a set of SBSs of the buyer
using the reverse auction. The resource block allocation to the
buyers is then based on the Stackelberg game.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[96]
Stackelberg
game MNOs Users Bandwidth
The Lagrange function and the projected gradient method are
applied to determine the optimal amounts of bandwidth for the users.
Then, optimal bandwidth prices for the MNOs are obtained by
taking the first derivation of their utilities.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[97]
Stackelberg
game MNO Users Bandwidth
The Lagrange function and the KKT conditions are applied to find
the optimal data rates for the users. Then, the greedy pricing
algorithm is adopted to update the bandwidth prices for the MNO.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[27] VCG auction MNO
Service
providers
Fronthaul
bandwidth
and radio
spectrum
Given the service providers’ bids, the MNO solves the WDP and
payment using the decomposition technique.
Optimal
solution CRAN
[100]
Share auction
and VCG
auction
MNO SPs andusers
Resource
blocks
MNO adopts the share auction to allocate the MNO’s RBs to the
SPs. Each SP applies the VCG with the greedy algorithm to allocate
the RBs to the users.
Nash
equilibrium CRAN
[30]
Combinatorial
auction MNO
MVNOs
and users
Subchannels
and
antennas
The combinatorial auction is adopted in both upper and lower levels
to allocate bundles of resources to the MVNOs and their users,
respectively. In both levels, the dynamic programming algorithm is
used to solve the WDP, and the VCG auction is employed to charge
the winners.
Optimal
solution MMN
[104]
Double
auction MNOs MVNOs Data rates
MNOs and MVNOs calculate and submit their bids to an SDN
controller. The SDN controller checks the convergence condition to
either match each MVNO and each MNO or update the shadow
prices using the subgradient descent method.
Competitive
equilibrium MMN
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TABLE VII: A summary of advantages and disadvantages of major approaches for spectrum allocation in 5G.
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[66] • Support multiple BSs • Have high computational complexity
[31] • Allow to allocate bundles of heterogeneous resources
• Have high computational complexity and support
only one MNO
[76] • Consider network effect • Support only two Service Providers (SPs)
[30] • Analyze interactions among multiple users, multiple MVNOs, and MNO • Have high computational complexity
[104] • Achieve win-win solution and support multiple MNOs and multiple MVNOs • Have slow convergence
MBS
(leader)
RRH
FUE
(follower)
Femtocell
Femtocell
FUE
(follower)
MUE
(leader)
RUE
(follower)
RUE
Fig. 14: Stackelberg game-based interference management in Het-
Nets.
is inversely proportional to its transmit power. As shown in
the simulation, a high price reduces significantly the transmit
power of the FUE. Thus the proposed scheme is useful for
interference control.
The same approach can be found in [107], but the fol-
lowers are SBSs instead of the FUEs. Moreover, the chan-
nel allocation is jointly considered. Specifically, given the
interference price offered by the MBS and the number of
allocated channels, each SBS determines its transmit power
to maximize its utility defined similarly to that in [24]. Given
the SBSs’ optimal transmit power, the MBS first determines
the optimal number of channels allocated to each SBS and then
the optimal interference price using the subgradient algorithm.
More specifically, the MBS initially sets the interference price
at a high value. Such a high price reduces the transmit power of
all SBSs and also the MBS’s utility. Then, the price decreases
with a step in each round until the utility of the MBS achieves
the maximum. The simulation results show that the proposed
scheme outperforms the algorithm without the power control
scheme in terms of average utility of the SBSs. The reason is
that the MBS charges a high interference price to the SBSs if
they do not perform power control.
The model and problem in [107] are also found in [108].
However, the exact potential game [109] is adopted to deter-
mine the optimal transmit power of the SBSs. The potential
game is a subclass of strategic normal games in which players’
objective functions are perfectly be aligned with one potential
function. The exact potential game is used since it always
converges to a unique Nash equilibrium.
The aforementioned approaches, i.e., [107] and [108], as-
sume that the channel gain information between the SBSs
and their associated users is known by all SBSs. In practice,
only the probability distribution of the information is typically
available. Therefore, for a given price offered by the MBS, i.e.,
the leader, the authors in [110] formulated a Bayesian game
with incomplete information among the SBSs, i.e., followers.
The fictitious play algorithm [111] is applied to the follower
game to obtain the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, i.e., the SBSs’
optimal power. Then, a learning algorithm is adopted which
allows the MBS to adjust the interference price to maximize
its average profit. Generally, the fictitious play algorithm for
the follower game does not converge. However, the simulation
results show that the proposed algorithm can converge very
fast in the case that the initial price is set close to the optimal
value.
In fact, since transmit power of SBSs is far smaller than
that of the MBS, the cross-tier interference from an MBS
to SBSs needs to be studied. This scenario was found in
[112] in which one MBS adjusts its transmit power according
to the interference prices offered by picocells. The MBS is
thus the follower, and the picocells are the leaders. Given the
interference prices of the picocells, the MBS determines the
optimal power allocation on its sub-carriers to maximize its
utility. The MBS’s problem is solved using the Lagrangian
function and the KKT condition. Then, each picocell de-
termines the optimal power on its sub-carrier and optimal
interference price to maximize its utility. The Lagrangian
function and the ellipsoid method [113] are applied to solve the
picocell’s problem. The picocell replies the information, i.e.,
power and price, to the MBS such that the MBS updates until
the Stackelberg equilibrium is reached. Such a process does
not require complete network knowledge, and thus reducing
signaling overhead.
The issues such as interference management, power allo-
cation, and channel allocation in [107] were also considered
in [114]. However, in the considered model, the leader is the
MNO instead of the MBS, and the followers are Unlicensed
Users (UUs) of femtocells instead of the SBSs. The optimiza-
tion problems of both the MNO and the UUs are then solved
using the standard convex optimization approaches.
UEs of RRHs, i.e., RUEs, in C-RANs may cause interfer-
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ences to the macro cell networks. In this context, the authors
in [20] considered the interference mitigation between macro
cell networks and C-RANs. As shown in Fig. 14, the MUE is
the leader which sets the interference prices, and the RUEs as
the followers decide their transmit power. Given the MUE’s
interference prices, the non-cooperative game is adopted to
model the interaction among the follower RUEs. The reason
is that while attempting to transmit their data, each RUE may
cause interference to other RUEs and reduce their utilities. The
iterative water-filling algorithm [115] is used to obtain RUEs’
optimal power. The MUE then applies the Lagrange method
and the KKT conditions to determine the optimal interference
prices. The simulation results show that the RUEs tend to
reduce the transmit power to stable values after only few
iterations. This means that the proposed scheme can quickly
converge and solve the interference problem.
Generally, due to the first-move advantage, the pricing
model based on the Stackelberg game is efficient for the
interference management in HetNets. However, 5G has very
high density of BSs/devices, and thus how one BS predicts
strategies of other BSs/devices and makes optimal strategies
is challenging.
2) General pricing: In fact, MBSs can set pre-defined
interference limits/thresholds for SBSs. Subject to the inter-
ference limits, then the SBSs determine their transmit power
to maximize the sum-rate of all the SBSs. The authors in
[116] adopted a distributed algorithm based on pricing strategy
to address the problem in a HetNet with multiple SBSs and
MBSs. The algorithm is essentially similar to that in [107].
The difference is that each SBS computes its transmit power
based on interference prices of multiple MBSs. Additionally,
each MBS locally updates its price depending on the difference
between the interference caused by the SBS to the MBS and
the MBS’s interference limit. If the interference is greater
than the interference limit, the MBS increases the price.
Otherwise, the price is set to zero. The process repeats until the
interference experienced by the MBS remains unchanged. It
is proved that by choosing the step-size sequence according to
the decreasing rule in [117] for the price update, the proposed
algorithm converges to a unique optimal power allocation
solution. The simulation results show that the transmission rate
of each SBS increases as the interference limit of each MBS
increases. However, the increased interference limit leads to
the high interference experienced by the MBSs’ users, thus
reducing the MBSs’ transmission rate.
A distributed algorithm based on pricing strategy was also
adopted in [118] for the interference control for femtocells in a
HetNet. First, each femtocell measures locally its SINR, utility
function, and effective interference caused by other femtocells
and MBSs. Femtocell i then calculates and broadcasts an inter-
ference price to other femtocells and MBSs. It simultaneously
updates its transmit power which is inversely proportional to
the sum of interference prices set by other femtocells and
MBSs. Note that before updating the current price/transmit
power, femtocell i observes and takes into account the last
power/price updates of other femtocells and MBSs. Such an
updating scheme is called gradient play [119]. As shown in
the simulation results, the proposed scheme has much lower
average transmit power than that of the distributed power
control without the price updating. However, the proposed
scheme has slower convergence speed due to simultaneously
updating price and power as well as synchronizing the step
for the updating.
The same algorithm for the interference management was
found in [120], but the proximal point method [121] is adopted
for updating the prices and power at the femtocells. More
specifically, at each iteration, the Variational Inequality (VI)
theory [122] is adopted to determine the generalized Nash
equilibrium for the femtocells. Then, the current price and
power are updated based on the generalized Nash equilibrium
obtained in the previous iteration.
Different from [116] and [118], the authors in [123] devel-
oped the allocation of transmit power to the RBs of D2D trans-
mitters to maximize the total utility of the D2D transmitters
subject to the interference at an MBS. The Lagrange method
is first adopted to the problem, and then the power and price
updating algorithm using the gradient projection is applied.
Here, two dual prices are updated to each D2D transmitter in
which the prices are paid to the MBS. Generally, the prices
increase if the total interference caused by all D2D transmitters
is greater than a pre-defined interference level at the MBS.
Then, the D2D transmitters update their transmit power which
is inversely proportional to the dual prices. The simulation
results show that the D2D pairs can achieve very high data
rates while generating low interference level at the MBS.
Moreover, the proposed algorithm’s complexity is polynomial
in the number of RBs and D2D pairs. This makes the proposed
algorithm feasible for practical implementations in 5G.
In fact, the problem in [123] can be addressed by a
distributed auction with multiple iterations as proposed in
[124]. In this model, the MBS is the auctioneer, and multiple
underlay users, i.e., SUEs and DUEs, are bidders. At each
iteration, each user selects a bid for the resources including
the RB and power level to maximize the user’s utility. Given
users’ bids, the MBS calculates the aggregated interference of
each RB and forms an assignment vector of all users. The
MBS then broadcasts these information to all users. Each user
checks if the aggregated interference of its selected RB is
greater than an interference threshold on the RB. If so, the
user needs to select another RB and power level. This process
is repeated until the assignment vector remains unchanged for
two successive iterations. The simulation results show that
the proposed algorithm performs close to the achievable data
rate of the exhaustive search with less complexity. However,
since each user locally decides its resource assignment, the
truthfulness of the auction needs to be studied.
3) Non-cooperative game: To improve the throughput of
each user, the Coordinated Multi-Point (CoMP) [12] can be
used which allows the user to be simultaneously served by a
set of BSs, i.e., MBSs and SBSs. As shown in Fig. 15, the
power received by the user is the total power transmitted from
the BSs in the set. While attempting to serve one user, a set
of BSs may cause interference to users in the other sets of
BSs. The non-cooperative game can be adopted as proposed
in [125] to address the interference among the sets of BSs in
CoMP and to maximize the system energy efficiency. In this
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Fig. 15: Non-cooperative game-based interference management in
HetNets which use Coordinated Multi-Point (CoMP).
game, the player is the whole set of BSs serving a particular
user. In other words, the BSs in the same set act collectively as
a single player. Each set determines the total transmit power to
serve its user to maximize its utility. The utility is a function
of the energy efficiency of the user and the price, i.e., the
penalty cost, that the set of BSs pays when the BSs in this set
cause interference to the users of other sets. It is proved that
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, i.e., the minimum total
transmit power of sets, which yields the highest utilities of the
sets of BSs. However, by using CoMP, the proposed scheme
has high communication overhead because of more signaling
among BSs in the set.
B. Energy Cost Minimization
To transmit a large amount of data traffic, 5G consumes
significant amount of energy. Renewable energy sources, i.e.,
solar and wind, are viable solutions to reduce the energy
cost. However, these energy sources have limited capacity and
their supply is random which may degrade performance of
the networks. The MNOs thus need to purchase the energy
from Power Suppliers (PSs). With energy trading, MNOs
aim to minimize their cost of energy while the PSs aim to
improve their profit. This section discusses the applications
of economic and pricing models for the energy trading in 5G
technologies, i.e., mmWave networks, HetNets, and C-RANs.
Different economic and pricing models are applied to different
technologies to minimize the energy consumption cost. For ex-
ample, the mmWave networks can support the backhaul links
which require high QoS, and thus the Stackelberg game and
the time-depending pricing are jointly used to maximize the
PSs’ profit while minimizing the energy cost and guaranteeing
the QoS for the MNOs. The C-RANs consume a large amount
of energy at BBUs and RRHs, and the cost minimization
problem can be used to minimize the energy costs at the BBUs
and RRHs.
1) MmWave networks: Consider the mmWave backhaul
network as shown in Fig. 7, the authors in [126] studied the
energy trading between one MNO as a buyer and multiple
PSs as sellers. The MNO purchases energy from the PSs
for its backhaul nodes to forward data traffic in multiple
epochs. The Stackelberg game is applied to minimize the
energy cost for the MNO and maximize the PSs’ profits.
First, the MNO as a leader sets price of power supply for
each PS in different epochs using the time-depending pricing
[127]. The time-depending pricing is used due to the fact that
the MNO has different QoS levels to support its data traffic
forwarding in different epochs according to the energy supply
from the PS. Given the prices, the non-cooperative game
is formulated among the PSs in which they simultaneously
determine optimal energy storage levels so as to maximize
their expected profits over epochs. The PSs need to determine
the optimal storage levels since overstocked energy will incur
extra storage costs for them. Based on the PSs’ optimal
strategies, the MNO determines prices of power supply so
as to maximize its expected profit. Here, the MNO’s profit is
inversely proportional to the prices that the MNO pays to the
PSs over epochs. The simulation results show that the system
profit, i.e., the sum of profits of the MNO and the PSs, obtained
from the proposed scheme is close to that obtained from the
centralized solution in which the MNO decides on the power
storage levels of all PSs. However, the system profit of the
proposed scheme substantially decreases when the number
of backhaul nodes increases due to their significant energy
consumption.
2) HetNets: Small cell networks in HetNets with energy
harvesting can make the networks greener. The SBSs in
these networks can share their energy with each other rather
than buying the energy from PSs to reduce the energy cost.
However, the SBSs may belong to different MNOs, and thus
the economic and pricing models are used to motivate MNOs
of the SBSs with surplus harvested energy to share and sell
their energy to those with energy deficit.
In a multi-seller multi-buyer market, the authors in [128]
adopted the double auction for the energy trading. The model
consists of SBSs with energy surplus as sellers, SBSs with
energy deficit as buyers, and one Central Authority (CA) as
the auctioneer. First, each SBS submits (i) the amount of total
energy in its battery and (ii) the amount of energy that it wants
to sell or to buy to the CA. Based on these information, the
CA calculates asks and bids for each unit of energy to sell and
to buy, respectively. The CA sorts the asks in an ascending
order and the bids in a descending order. The seller-buyer
matching is then determined similarly to that in the classical
double auction with some modifications. First, the deal price is
a random price which can follow any probability distribution
such that the algorithm converges. Setting the random price
independent of the information submitted by the SBSs is to
avoid misreporting from them. Second, the matching process
considers locations of the SBSs to minimize the load on
the electrical grid. The CA then calculates the prices paid
to the winning SBSs and the prices charged to the winning
SBSs based on their valuations of the amount of energy. The
simulation results show that the proposed scheme outperforms
the matching game-based algorithm [129] in the electrical
grid usage reduction. The reason is that when performing the
matching process, the proposed scheme considers more the
distance between SBSs rather than the utility functions, i.e.,
usage costs, as in the matching game-based algorithm.
24
Fronthaul links/
fiber-optic links
Backhaul 
links
BBU pool
BBU
BBU
BBU
RRH
RRH
RRH
User
(buyer)
User
(buyer)
Core 
network
Selling 
price
Buying 
price
Renewable 
energy
Energy 
supplier 
(seller)
Virtual 
machine
VM
MNO 
(buyer)
Smart 
grid
Cloud
VM
VM
Fig. 16: Energy trading in C-RAN for cost minimization.
3) C-RANs: RRHs and BBUs in C-RANs can also be
equipped with renewable energy sources as shown in Fig. 16.
Then, the MNO which owns the C-RANs may buy/sell en-
ergy from/to the PSs depending on the availability of the
renewable energy. In particular, if the renewable energy at
each RRH/BBU is more than the needed energy for data
transmission, the MNO sells the surplus energy to the PSs.
Otherwise, the MNO needs to buy energy for the RRH from
the PSs.
In this context, the authors in [130] analyzed the energy
trading among one MNO and one PS by formulating the
cost minimization problem. Specifically, the problem is to
determine the resource allocation to minimize the sum of
the cost functions at the RRHs and at the BBUs. Here,
the resources to be allocated include (i) the energy bought
from the PS for the RRHs and the BBUs, (ii) the achievable
rates for the MNO’s users, and (iii) the assigned computation
capabilities of VMs in the BBUs to serve users. The cost
function at each RRH/BBU is the difference between the price
for purchasing energy from the PS and the price received for
selling renewable energy to the PS. The problem is then solved
by the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM)
algorithm [131]. The simulation results show that the cost
function at each RRH or BBU reduces with the decrease of
the data rate. Moreover, there is a balance point at which
the cost function is zero. This means that the MNO uses all
the harvested energy to satisfy the user requirements without
buying/selling energy from/to the PS. However, the prices used
in the energy trading are given a priori. A dynamic pricing
strategy needs to be considered in the future work.
In practice, the fronthaul links between the RRHs and the
BBUs may belong to a cloud provider. Therefore, the MNO
needs to incorporate the cost of using the fronthaul links into
the cost functions. Thus the authors in [132] formulated a
problem which determines transmit power for all RRHs to
minimize (i) the total transmit power from the RRHs to users
and (ii) the total cost that the MNO pays the cloud provider
for using the fronthaul links. In particular, the total cost is
calculated based on prices of fronthaul bandwidth associated
with the RRHs. The optimization problem is first relaxed
using the concave approximation and then solved using the
gradient method. It is shown that the total transmit power of
the proposed scheme is much lower than that of the iterative
link removal algorithm in [133]. However, the computational
complexity of the proposed scheme significantly increases
when the cluster size, i.e., the maximum number of RRHs
serving one user, is large.
Summary: This section has discussed the applications of
economic and pricing models for the interference and power
management in 5G. The objective is to minimize the intra-tier
and inter-tier interferences as well as the energy consumption
cost. A summary of the related works is given in Table VIII,
and a summary of advantages and disadvantages of major
works in Table IX. As seen, the economic and pricing models
are mostly used to mitigate the interference caused by the
SBSs or their users to MBSs. Although the SBS deployment
poses the interference management as a challenge, the SBSs
can provide mobile data offloading services and wireless
caching schemes to offload as well as to reduce traffic from
MBSs. The next section discusses the economic and pricing
models for the mobile data offloading and wireless caching
in 5G HetNets to improve the profits for the owners of both
SBSs and MBSs.
VII. APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC AND PRICING MODELS
FOR WIRELESS CACHING AND MOBILE DATA OFFLOADING
Two important services provided by SBSs in 5G HetNets
are wireless caching and mobile data offloading. The wireless
caching refers to caching contents such as popular videos
or web information in the storage/memory of SBSs. The
mobile data offloading allows to use SBSs to reduce the
traffic being carried on MBSs. These services can (i) reduce
the transmission latency of content requests from users, (ii)
mitigate the redundant transmissions of popular contents over
backhaul links, (iii) achieve higher energy efficiency, and (iv)
significantly improve network capacity as well as coverage.
However, the SBSs and MBSs may belong to different owners.
Besides, the SBSs typically have limited resources, i.e., power,
storage, and bandwidth, as well as less security. Economic and
pricing models can be applied to improve profits of the owners
of the SBSs, and thus incentivizing the owners to provide
the wireless caching and offloading services. The following
subsections review the economic and pricing approaches for
wireless caching and mobile data offloading.
A. Profit Maximization Through Caching
This section reviews economic and pricing models for
wireless caching in 5G HetNets. A common scenario involves
Content Providers (CPs), e.g., Youtube, which act as buyers
and MNOs which act as sellers. The CPs lease the storage
space at SBSs of MNOs to store files and serve the CPs’ users.
The CPs pay certain prices to the MNOs for leasing the storage
space. Different economic and pricing models can be used
depending on specific objectives. For example, to maximize
profits for both MNOs and CPs which have a hierarchical
interaction, the Stackelberg game is used. To either maximize
the profits for MNOs or minimize the caching payments for
CPs, single-side auctions are adopted.
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TABLE VIII: Applications of economic and pricing models for interference and power management (MWN: Millimeter Wave
Network, CRAN: Cloud Radio Access Network, HN: Heterogeneous Network).
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Solution NetworkSeller Buyer Item
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[24]
Stackelberg
game MBS FUEs Power
The KKT conditions are used to determine the optimal power for the
FUEs. The Lagrange method and the complementary slackness condition
are applied to determine the optimal interference prices for the MBS.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[107]
Stackelberg
game MBS SBSs
Channels
and
power
SBSs determine their optimal transmit power using the first derivative.
Then, the MBS determines the optimal number of channels and
interference price for the SBSs based on the subgradient algorithm.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[108]
Stackelberg
game MBS SBSs Power
Same as [107], but the exact potential game is used to determine the
SBSs’ optimal transmit power.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[110]
Stackelberg
Bayesian
game
MBS SBSs Power The Bayesian game is used to determine the SBSs’ optimal transmitpower, and a learning algorithm is adopted to determine the optimal price.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[112]
Stackelberg
game Picocells MBS Power
The KKT conditions are used to determine the optimal power of the MBS
and picocells, and the ellipsoid method is used to calculate the optimal
interference prices of picocells.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[114]
Stackelberg
game MNO
Unlicensed
users
Sub-
bands
and
power
Same as [24], but the optimal power for the unlicensed users and the
optimal interference prices for the MNO are determined using the standard
convex optimization approaches.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[20]
Stackelberg
game MUE RUEs Power
The optimal power for the RUEs are determined using the iterative
water-filling algorithm. Then, the optimal interference prices for the MUE
are determined using the Lagrange method and the KKT conditions.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[116]
General
pricing MBSs SBSs Power
MBSs control transmit power of the SBSs by adjusting the interference
prices according to the decreasing rule in [117].
Optimal
solution HN
[118]
General
pricing Femtocells
Femtocells
and MBSs Power
Femtocells calculate and broadcast interference prices. Each femtocell then
updates its transmit power and price by using the gradient play scheme.
Nash
equilibrium HN
[123]
General
pricing MBS
D2D
transmit-
ters
Power The gradient projection algorithm is applied to update power and dualprices for the D2D transmitters.
Nash
equilibrium HN
[124]
Distributed
auction MBS
Underlay
users
Resource
blocks
and
power
Each underlay user locally decides its resource assignment if the
aggregated interference caused by the resource is smaller than an
interference threshold.
Nash
equilibrium HN
[12]
Non-
cooperative
game
BS sets BS sets Power The optimal transmit power for sets of buying BSs are determined via theNash equilibrium.
Nash
equilibrium HN
E
ne
rg
y
co
st
m
in
im
iz
at
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n
[126]
Stackelberg
game
Renewable
power
suppliers
MNO Renewableenergy
MNO sets power prices over epochs using the time-depending pricing.
Then, the power suppliers determine optimal energy storage levels via the
non-cooperative game.
Stackelberg
equilibrium MWN
[128]
Double
auction SBSs SBSs
Renewable
energy
The central authority calculates asks for the selling SBSs and bids for the
buying SBSs. Then, it matches the buyers and the sellers based on a
random price.
Nash
equilibrium HN
[130]
Cost
minimization
Power
supplier MNO Power
MNO determines the amount of energy for trading to minimize its total
cost. The ADMM algorithm is then applied to solve the problem.
Optimal
solution CRAN
[132]
General
pricing
Cloud
provider MNO
Fronhaul
capacity
Given the fronthaul bandwidth prices, the concave approximation and the
gradient method are used to determine the transmit power for all RRHs.
Optimal
solution CRAN
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SBS
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MNO
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SBS
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Memory
/storage
Fig. 17: Wireless caching based on Stackelberg game in HetNets
where CP stands for Content Provider.
1) Stackelberg game: The authors in [134] applied the
Stackelberg game for the wireless caching to improve the
profits of one CP as a follower and multiple MNOs as
leaders. Such Stackelberg game with multiple leaders but
single follower is practically not so common. The model is
shown in Fig. 17 in which each MNO as a seller owns multiple
SBSs, and the CP as the buyer decides to rent a fraction of
cache storages of SBSs based on the MNO’s offered price.
First, given the MNOs’ prices, the CP adopts the conventional
water-filling algorithm [115] to determine an SBS utilization
fraction vector to maximize its profit. The profit of the CP
is the difference between the total revenue from providing
downloading services to its users and the total price for renting
the SBSs. Based on the CP’s optimal renting fractions of
SBSs, each MNO determines a common leasing price for
its SBSs using the KKT conditions so as to maximize the
MNO’s profit. Due to the limited budget of the CP, the MNOs
compete with each other in the non-cooperative game. Thus
each MNO needs to update its leasing price after the other
MNOs change the leasing prices. The optimization process
is repeated to reach the convergence. The simulation results
show that the profits of the CP and the MNOs increase as the
budget increases. Especially, there is a budget value at which
the CP’s profit is maximum. However, how the CP sets this
budget value is not explained. Also, the proof of existence and
uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium is not given.
The Stackelberg game for the wireless caching was also
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TABLE IX: A summary of advantages and disadvantages of major approaches for interference and power management.
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[107] • Consider jointly interference management and channel allocation
• Need to know the channel gain information between the SBS
and their users
[110] • Have fast convergence • Support only one MBS
[124] • Have low complexity • Support only one MBS and do not consider truthfulness
[12] • Support multiple MBSs and SBSs and CoMP technology • Have high communication overhead
[128] • Analyze interactions among multiple SBSs • Need a Central Authority (CA) and have slow convergence
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Fig. 18: Wireless caching based on Stackelberg game in D2D
networks.
studied in [135]. However, the considered model consists of
multiple CPs as followers, i.e., buyers, and a single MNO as
a leader, i.e., a seller. Based on the caching prices announced
by the MNO, the CP responds with a quantity of cached files
to maximize the CP’s profit, i.e., the difference between its
revenue and the price that it pays the MNO. Due to the limited
storage capacity of the SBSs, the competition among the CPs
is formulated as a non-cooperative game. The Cramer’s rule is
applied to obtain the optimal quantity of cached files for each
CP. Given the CPs’ optimal responses, the MNO optimizes
the price to maximize its profit, i.e., the difference between its
total price received from the CPs and the total cost of caching
the CPs’ files. The optimal price is obtained using the first
derivative of the profit function. The simulation results show
that the MNO’s profit improves up to 50% of that in the case
when the MNO chooses arbitrary prices. However, the profits
of the CPs decrease when the number of CPs increases. This
is because of that more CPs result in higher competition on
the cache storage, and the price charged to the CPs is higher.
Due to the scarcity of licensed spectrum, using the SBSs
for wireless caching may not be effective. D2D users can
cache video contents of the CPs to reduce caching costs at
SBSs. Such a D2D user is called caching user which precaches
certain amount of contents from the CPs. Then, the caching
user can transfer the content to other users, namely peers.
However, the design of incentive mechanisms is challenging
due to the heterogeneous preference and selfish nature of the
caching user.
To address the challenge, the authors in [136] adopted the
Stackelberg game to model the interaction between a caching
user as a leader, i.e., a seller, and its peers as the followers,
i.e., buyers. Given the prices offered by the caching user, each
peer determines an amount of content to maximize its utility.
The peer’s utility depends on its valuation from receiving the
content, network effect, congestion effect, and price that the
peer pays the caching user. In particular, the network effect
is defined in Section V-B1. The optimal amount of content
to be transferred for each peer is obtained by taking the first
derivative of its utility function. Given the optimal amounts
requested by the peers, the caching user chooses prices per
unit of content to maximize its profit. Generally, the optimal
prices depend on the network and congestion effects. As shown
in the simulation results, the caching user receives high profit
if the network effect increases since higher prices can be set
to the peers. However, when there exists only the congestion
effect, the profit is zero since the peers cannot obtain their
requested contents from the caching user due to the network
congestion.
In fact, caching users can assist the MBS to transmit their
precached popular files to the MBS’s subscribers. To maximize
the profit for the caching users while guaranteeing a non-
negative utility for the MBS, the Stackelberg game is used
as proposed in [137]. In this model, the caching users initiate
transactions by providing prices for transmitting the files. Thus
the caching users are leaders, i.e., sellers, and the MBS is the
follower, i.e., the buyer. First, the MBS broadcasts the file
request from its subscribers to all caching users. Each caching
user replies to the MBS with a price per unit of power for
transmitting the file. The optimal price is determined so as
to maximize the caching user’s profit. Given the prices, the
MBS calculates the optimal power for each caching user to
maximize the MBS’s utility, i.e., the difference between the
gain from the sum rate of transmitting the file from the caching
users and the prices that the MBS pays them. Generally, the
optimal power that the MBS buys from a caching user is
affected by not only the caching user’s optimal price, but
also optimal power of other caching users. As shown in the
simulation results, when the MBS buys more power, the profits
of the caching users and the utility of the MBS both increase.
However, the utility of the MBS then decreases as the power
increases due to its higher payment.
The same model is also found in [138], but the caching
users are the followers, and the MBS is the leader. The MBS,
i.e., a buyer, requests each caching user, i.e., a seller, to cache
contents of the caching user’s neighbors. As shown in Fig. 18,
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given the caching price offered by the MBS, each caching user
determines caching strategies, i.e., the portions of contents that
the caching user serves their neighbors, to maximize its utility.
The utility of the caching user is the difference between the
total price that the caching user receives from the MBS and the
caching user’s total delay cost. Based on the Schauder fixed-
point theorem [139], it is proved that there exists at least one
Nash equilibrium for the sub-game among the caching users.
Given the optimal caching strategies, the MBS determines the
caching price to minimize its total cost. The iterative gradient
algorithm is then used to find the Stackelberg equilibrium of
the game. In practice, due to their mobility, the neighbors
of each caching user may vary which affects the caching
strategies of the caching user. This issue needs to be considered
in the future work.
2) Auction: Due to the limited cache storage capacity of the
SBSs, CPs have to evaluate their own contents and compete
for cache storages of the MNO. Auction schemes such as
the iterative auctions can be used for the wireless caching to
maximize the profits of both sides.
Such an approach can be found in [140] which adopts the
Ascending Clock Auction (ACA) for the wireless caching. The
model consists of one MNO as a seller and multiple CPs as
buyers. The MNO first announces a common leasing price
for its SBSs, and each CP computes the faction of the SBSs’
storages so as to maximize its profit. The CPs then submit their
optimal fractions to the MNO. If the total fraction demand
is greater than the resources that the MNO can supply, the
MNO will increase the price in the next iteration to curtail
the demand. Otherwise, the CPs cannot afford renting more
SBSs, and the auction is terminated. Since the renting price is
an increasing function with iteration, and the fraction demand
is a decreasing function of the price, the auction will converge.
In fact, since each CP locally decides its resource allocation,
the CP may cheat the MNO by submitting a distorted demand.
For example, the CP may claim less fraction of the SBSs than
that needed to obtain a lower price from the MNO. To solve
this issue, the MNO determines the SBS allocation to each CP
based on the other CPs’ bids rather than the one from itself.
Then, the payment for each CP in each iteration is determined
by computing a cumulative clinch, i.e., the fraction of SBSs
that the CP is guaranteed to win in the iteration. As shown in
the simulation results, each CP achieves its maximum profit
only when it does not cheat the MNO.
To improve the revenue for both the MNO and the CPs as
well as some desired economic properties, the double auction
can be used as proposed in [141]. The model is shown in
Fig. 19 with one MNO as the seller and CPs as buyers. Each
CP requires cache storage space for its files at different SBSs.
Depending on the popularity of the files, the CP may have
different valuations of the storage space at different SBSs.
Thus the CP can be represented by a set of Virtual CPs (VCPs),
each of which as a bidder is associated with an SBS. The VCP
submits its bid to an auctioneer which specifies the price that
the VCP is willing to pay the MNO for the storage space
at the corresponding SBS. Also, the MNO submits its asks
to the auctioneer which specifies the price of cache storage
space at the corresponding SBS. Matching the VCPs’ bids
Auctioneer
Bid
Bid
Ask
Ask
Ask
VCP
(bidder)
VCP
(bidder)
CP (buyer)
VCP
(bidder)
VCP
(bidder)
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Fig. 19: Wireless caching based on double auction in HetNets where
VCP stands for Virtual Content Provider.
and the MNO’s asks as well as payment determination for
them are similar to the matching and payment of the classical
double auction. Generally, reference [141] is the pioneer work
which uses the concept of VCP. However, other issues such
as bandwidth allocation to the CPs need to be incorporated
into the storage sharing problem to make the scheme more
practical for implementation.
In the scenario with multiple sellers and one buyer, the
authors in [142] applied the reverse auction as presented in
Section III-C4 to minimize the caching payment for the CP.
The model consists of one CP as the buyer and multiple
MNOs as the sellers. Each MNO owns one SBS. First, the
MNOs submit their asks to the CP. Each MNO’s ask specifies
the price of storage that the MNO is willing to pay and the
amount of storage that its SBS can provide. Based on this
information, the CP calculates cache hit rate, i.e., a probability
that the requested content can be found in the cache, for each
SBS. The CP calculates a ratio of the price submitted by
each MNO to the cache hit rate of the MNO’s SBS. The CP
then sorts the SBSs in an ascending order of their ratios and
selects a certain number of SBSs with the lowest ratios as the
winning SBSs. Such a selection process is to minimize the
caching payment for the CP. A price paid to each MNO of
the winning SBS is determined based on the ratio of a critical
SBS, i.e., the first SBS which is not selected by the CP. Since
the payments to the MNOs are larger than their submitted
prices, the proposed scheme achieves the individual rationality,
i.e., the non-negative utilities for the MNOs, and truthfulness.
However, when the prices submitted by the MNOs are high,
the CP may pay more to the MNOs. In this case, the utility of
the CP decreases while that of the MNOs increases, meaning
that there is a transfer of utility from the CP to the MNOs.
Thus the proposed scheme does not guarantee the social
welfare maximization.
The caching payment minimization and truthfulness can be
guaranteed by a multi-item auction as proposed in [143]. Here,
items are the storages of SBSs owned by MNOs, and the
bidders are the CPs which have different sets of contents.
Based on the storage prices offered by the MNOs, the CPs
bid the most preferred storages of the contents using the
preferred-storage graph [144]. The Breadth-First-Search (BFS)
algorithm [145] is applied to match each content and each
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storage. If there are some unmatched contents, the MNOs
increase the prices of the unmatched storages uniformly until
at least one CP changes its preferred-storages. If the lowest
price is non-zero, the prices of all storages are deducted by the
lowest price. This pricing strategy is to keep the prices of all
storages as the lowest market-clearing price which achieves
the truthfulness and reduces the caching payment for the
CPs. Again, the preferred-storage graph is rebuilt until all the
contents are matched. The final prices are the trading prices
of the auction.
In fact, the CPs can change their cached contents dynam-
ically to adapt to the variation of the content popularity and
the user preference. Since the new contents are transferred
from core networks via the backhaul, there is additional
instantaneous traffic load which burdens the backhaul and
increases the average delay. To improve the revenue for the
MNOs and to reduce the content replacement rates of the CPs,
the authors in [146] introduced an additional price to charge
the CPs for replacing the original contents. The additional
price is generally determined based on the traffic load of the
backhaul and the content replacement rates by the CPs. As
shown in the simulation results, a high additional price reduces
sharply the content replacement rate by the CPs. However, the
high additional price also reduces the utility of the CPs and
may discourage them to use the caching services.
3) Profit maximization: To reduce heavy traffic load during
peak time periods and hence improve QoS for users, the CP
can proactively serve its users’ future content requests during
the off-peak time periods. To achieve this goal, the CP needs
to track and predict the content demand of the users, e.g.,
using machine learning tools.
In this context, the authors in [147] adopted the profit
maximization problem to maximize the CP’s profit while
improving the QoS for the users. The model consists of
one CP as a seller and one user as a buyer. The CP owns
several data items such as movies. First, the CP constructs
a demand profile for the user at every time slot by using
machine learning tools such as collaborative filtering. The
demand profile at a time slot includes elements, each of which
is the probability that the user requests a data item at the
time slot. The CP’s problem is to determine (i) data items
which will be proactively served at every time slot and (ii)
the prices for the data items to maximize the CP’s profit, i.e.,
the difference between its revenue and cost. The CP solves the
profit maximization problem by running an iterative algorithm.
By showing that the CP’s profit increases after each iteration
and has an upper bound, the algorithm is proved to converge
to a globally optimal solution of the prices and the data items
to be served. However, no specific method is given for the
convergence proof.
The proposed scheme in [147] is the pioneer work which
discusses the proactive content provision in wireless environ-
ments. However, more general scenarios, e.g., multiple CPs
and multiple users or one CP and multiple users, need to be
investigated. For the scenario with multiple CPs and multiple
users, each user can select its preferred CP based on the
content freshness and the prices given by the CP. Assigning
each user to each CP can be performed by, e.g., the double
auction or matching theory, to achieve desired economic
properties. For the scenario with one CP and multiple users,
to guarantee the profit improvement for the CP, the profit
maximization in [147] can be used again. However, in this
case, the iterative algorithm with two steps should be executed
in a distributed manner to reduce the centralized complexity
at the CP. More specifically, the first step can be run by the
CP to set prices so as to maximize its profit while the second
step is executed by the users to determine data items to be
proactively served so as to minimize the users’ own payments.
Nevertheless, it is challenging to prove the convergence of the
algorithm in this case.
4) Contract theory: Each CP serves directly requests of
its users, the CP is thus aware of content popularity as well
as preferences of the users while the MNO may not have
this information. Therefore, there is an information asymmetry
between the MNO and the CP. The content popularity creates
so-called types of each CP. The CP’s type is high (low) when
its content popularity is high (low). The CP may announce
false information about its type to maliciously improve its
utility as well as the performance of its users. For example, by
claiming that its content popularity is higher than it actually
is, the CP can enable the MNO to allocate more storage
space. The CP then pays lower prices while also lowering
the interference experienced by its users. As a result, the CPs
may have an incentive to not reveal their correct types so as
to pay lower prices to the MNO.
To address this issue, the authors in [148] adopted the
contract theory to construct storage-price bundles. The model
consists of one MNO, i.e., seller, and multiple CPs, i.e., buyers.
The MNO’s problem is to determine the prices charged to the
CPs based on their types and the required amounts of storage
space to be allocated to the CPs so as to maximize the total
utility of the CPs. Each CP’s utility is the difference between
its valuation and the price that the CP pays the MNO for the
allocated storage. The optimization problem is NP-hard, and
the matching theory and the swap-based deferred acceptance
algorithm [149] are adopted to assign the storages of the SBSs
of the MNO to the CPs. Then, the MNO determines the price
charged to each CP by taking into account the impact of the
CP on the utility of other CPs. Generally, a higher price will
be charged to the CP if a larger amount of storage space
is allocated to the CP. The simulation results show that the
proposed scheme improves the utility of the CPs up to 140%
compared with the equal storage allocation model. The reason
is that the proposed scheme allocates to all CPs only the
amounts of storage space that they need.
The optimization problem and model in [148] were also
considered in [150]. However, a parameter which represents
the content popularity is incorporated in the optimization
problem. Depending on the value of the popularity parameter,
the MNO checks the individual rationality constraint of the
contract or uses the standard Lagrangian method to determine
the optimal contract, i.e., the optimal prices and storages, for
types of CPs. The simulation results show that the profits of
both the MNO and CPs are convex functions which decrease
with the increase of the popularity parameter.
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B. Energy Efficiency Optimization Though Offloading
In 5G HetNets, MBSs consume the major part of the
network energy, and thus the minimization of the consumed
energy is needed. This goal can be achieved by mobile data
offloading schemes which use the resources of SBSs to offload
traffic of users from MBSs. Since the SBSs may be owned by
third-parties, e.g., Femto Holders (FHs), the profit improve-
ment for the third-parties needs to be guaranteed. Pricing
models based on auctions or game theory are developed
to provide an optimal solution that minimizes the energy
consumption and maximizes the third-party’s profit.
To achieve the objectives while guaranteeing the truthful-
ness, the VCG auction can be used as proposed in [151].
The model includes multiple MNOs as buyers and one FH
as the seller, i.e., the auctioneer. Each MNO owns one MBS,
and the FH has multiple SBSs. First, each MNO submits a
bid which specifies an SBS and a price that the MNO is
willing to pay the FH. The problem is to select the MNOs
to maximize the FH’s profit while minimizing the number
of active MBSs of the MNOs, i.e., minimizing the energy
consumption for the MNOs. To achieve the objectives of all
stakeholders simultaneously, the Integer Linear Programming
(ILP) multi-objective optimization problem is adopted and
solved for the winning MNO selection. Then, to guarantee
the truthful bidding, the VCG payment policy is applied to
determine the charge for each winning MNO. The simulation
results show that the proposed scheme improves significantly
the energy efficiency compared with the switching-off scheme
[152]. However, the proposed scheme has higher complexity
due to the multi-objective problem.
The approach based on the VCG auction for the energy
efficiency maximization is also found in [153]. In this model,
the MBS is the buyer, and SBSs are the sellers. The SBSs
submit their asks to the buyer. Each ask includes the infor-
mation of the number of resource blocks and power units
which the SBS can provide. The MBS selects the SBSs
which can maximize the system energy efficiency, i.e., the
ratio of the total throughput to the total transmit power. The
WDP is considered to be multiple knapsack problem which
is then solved by the dynamic programming method with
KKT conditions. Similar to [151], the VCG payment policy
is used to calculate the charge for each winner. As shown
in the simulation results, the proposed scheme significantly
improves the system energy efficiency compared with the
traffic offloading scheme based on fractional frequency reuse
[154]. However, the proposed scheme’s performance only
increases slightly when the number of SBSs is large. The
reason is that inter-cell interferences are more severe.
To maximize the utility of the MBS, the forward auction
can be applied as proposed in [155]. The considered model is
similar to that in [153], but the MBS is the auctioneer, i.e.,
the seller, its users are commodities, and SBSs are bidders,
i.e., buyers. Moreover, the MBS selects the SBSs which can
provide the highest SINRs for offloading the MBS’s users.
It can be seen that using the multi-objective optimization
or multiple knapsack problem as proposed in [151] or [153]
increases the computational complexity. Distributed auctions
MBS
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SBS
(seller)
FUE MUE
?
MUE
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Fig. 20: Auction-based mobile data offloading in HetNets.
such as the ACA can be used as proposed in [32]. The model
is shown in Fig. 20 with SBSs as the sellers and the MBS as
the auctioneer. The SBSs compete with each other to offload
users of the MBS. The MBS first announces an initial price
that it is willing to pay to all the SBSs. Given the price,
each SBS determines its supply quantity, i.e., the number
of users that can be offloaded by the SBS, to maximize its
profit. Meanwhile, the MBS calculates its demand quantity,
i.e., the number of offloading users, to maximize its utility.
Here, the MBS’s utility is the difference between its revenue
for saving power from the user offloading and the total price
that the MBS pays all SBSs. If the total supply quantity is
less than the demand quantity, the MBS increases the price
to stimulate the SBSs to increase their supply quantities. The
process continues until the total supply equals the demand.
Since the SBSs calculate the supply quantities based only
on their local information and the given price, the proposed
scheme has small communication overhead, and thus reducing
energy consumption of the network. However, how the MBS
then assigns the exact users with the shortest distance to the
corresponding SBS to minimize the total energy consumption
is not considered in the proposed scheme.
Apart from improving the energy efficiency, mobile data
offloading in 5G HetNets aims to maximize the utility for
the owners of MBSs and SBSs. One approach can be found
in [156] in which one MNO as the buyer leases the SBSs
of one FH, i.e., the seller, to offload the data of the MNO’s
MBSs. To maximize the utility of both the MNO and the FH,
the Stackelberg game is adopted. First, the FH as the leader
determines the price for offloading a unit of traffic to maximize
its profit. Given the price, the MNO as the follower calculates
the amount of traffic so as to maximize its utility, i.e., the
difference between its satisfaction and the price paid to the
FH for offloading. A more general scenario with multiple FHs
and MNOs is then investigated, and the maximum weighted
bipartite matching algorithm [157] is applied to find the
optimal pairs of sellers and buyers. For the future work, the
energy efficiency issue, e.g., the determination of inactive
SBSs/MBSs, can be considered.
Another approach using the Stackelberg game is proposed in
[158] in which the FH is the leader, and the users of MBSs, i.e.,
MUEs, are followers. First, given the FH’s power prices, each
MUE as a buyer determines its power demand to maximize its
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Fig. 21: Ratios of related work for (a) resource management issues
and (b) 5G technologies.
utility, i.e., the difference between its utility gain and the power
price. The MUE’s problem is a convex optimization which has
a globally optimal solution. Given the MUEs’ optimal power,
the FH chooses optimal prices for the MUEs to maximize
its revenue. When the total power demand of the MUEs is
greater than the maximum power of the FH, the FH increases
the prices to regulate the MUEs’ demand. Then, the MUE’s
problem and FH’s problem are solved again. This process
repeats until the total power demand equals the maximum
power. Based on the first order Taylor approximation, the
algorithm is proved to converge to the unique Stackelberg
equilibrium.
Summary: In this section, we have reviewed the applica-
tions of economic and pricing models for wireless caching and
mobile data offloading in 5G HetNets. The related works are
summarized in Table X, and advantages and disadvantages of
major approaches are given in Table XI. As clearly shown in
Table X, economic and pricing approaches for the wireless
caching receive more attentions. The reason may be that re-
ducing network traffic and energy consumption over backhaul
links in HetNets are crucial. However, some challenges for the
wireless caching such as limited cache space of SBSs, high
user mobility, and privacy concerns, need to be considered.
VIII. SUMMARY, CHALLENGES, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
Different approaches reviewed in this survey evidently show
that economic and pricing models can effectively address re-
source management issues to meet the diverse requirements of
the emerging 5G technologies. Fig. 21(a) and Fig. 21(b) show
the ratios of economic and pricing approaches for different
resource management issues and different 5G technologies
respectively. From the figures, we observe that majority of
the approaches are for HetNets while few approaches are
for C-RANs. There are further challenges and new research
directions as follows.
A. Mobility of users
In the spectrum allocation [88], an offline auction is used
in which mobile users are assumed to be stationary. They
simultaneously submit required bandwidth and prices that they
are willing to pay to the MNO. The MNO then determines the
winner. In reality, the mobile users can move through multiple
cells of different MNOs with high speed, e.g., a hundred km/h.
In this case, the users may arrive in each cell one by one in
a random order, and the offline auction may not be suitable.
Alternatively, an online auction, e.g., as presented in [159],
can be used which allows each MNO to decide whether the
user wins or not immediately based on hitherto information
available with the awareness of potential future bids.
B. Security and privacy
When users move through multiple cells, the security and
privacy issues arise due to the possible involvement of un-
trusted or compromised network devices. Two common attacks
that the users face are eavesdropping attack and Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.
In the eavesdropping attack, untrusted networks can eaves-
drop the communication information between legitimate users
and intended networks, e.g., small cell access points. To
prevent the eavesdropping attack, cryptographic techniques
are typically used. However, the techniques often require
centralized authorities and additional secure channels for key
exchanges. They thus have computation burden to both the
legitimate users and the intended networks which are undesir-
able for 5G low-power network infrastructures. Alternatively,
economic and pricing models can provide distributed solutions
which maximize the secrecy capacity for the legitimate com-
munication links without requiring additional secure channels
for key exchanges [19].
In the DDoS attack, a large number of compromised de-
vices, also known as bots, inside the network can be controlled
by an external attacker to transmit radio jamming signals
with high power to legitimate users and base stations. This
attack makes the legitimate users and cells unavailable to
respond to any service requests from the legitimate users.
The DDoS attack is known as one of the most severe attacks
due to the use of thousands of bots distributed over the
network. However, since the bots need to consume much
network resources for their attack actions, they are subject
to the resource prices. If the bots are rational, setting high
resource prices discourages them to spend more power to
perform the attack actions. Behavior-based pricing models
such as Bayesian optimal pricing [160] can be adopted to
easily achieve this goal.
C. Resource Management for Network Function Virtualization
(NFV) and Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
NFV and SDN allow 5G to efficiently accommodate a wide
range of services over a common network infrastructure. While
the SDN decouples the network control and forwarding func-
tions [26], the NFV decomposes network functions from the
physical network equipments. Such software-based solutions
can provide the programmability, flexibility, and modularity
that are required to create multiple logical/virtual networks.
The virtual networks are namely network slices, each of which
serves a specific requirement of a user or a set of users. The
NFV and SDN bring several benefits such as reducing the
OPEX and CAPEX for the MNOs, facilitating the deployment
of new services with increased agility and faster time-to-
value, and achieving better system scalability according to user
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TABLE X: Applications of economic and pricing models for wireless caching and mobile data offloading (HN: Heterogeneous
Network).
Ref. Pricing model Market structure Mechanism Solution NetworkSeller Buyer Item
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[134]
Stackelberg
game MNOs
Content
Provider
(CP)
SBSs
CP uses the conventional water-filling algorithm to decide optimal fractions of
SBSs to rent. Given the optimal fractions, the MNOs determine their leasing
prices via the non-cooperative game.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[135]
Stackelberg
game MNO CPs
Caching
service
CPs determine the optimal quantities of their caching files via the
non-cooperative game. Then, the MNO determines the optimal service price.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[136]
Stackelberg
game
Caching
user Peers
Caching
service
Peers determine the optimal amounts of content for caching. Then, the caching
user determines the caching prices for the peers taking into account the
network and congestion effects.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[137]
Stackelberg
game
Caching
users MBS Power
Caching users determine the optimal prices, and then the MBS calculates its
optimal power for each caching user.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[138]
Stackelberg
game
Caching
users MBS
Caching
content
Caching users determine the optimal portions of contents by using the
Schauder fixed-point theorem. Then, the MBS calculates the optimal price.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[140] ACA MNO CPs SBSs
The MNO adjusts the leasing price such that the total supply quantity equals
the demand quantity.
Walrasian
equilibrium HN
[141]
Double
auction MNO CPs
Cache
storages
Matching the VCPs’ bids and the MNO’s asks as well as payment
determination for them are similar to those of the classical double auction.
Market
equilibrium HN
[142]
Reverse
auction MNOs CP
Cache
storages CP uses the greedy algorithm to select SBSs according to their cache hit rates.
Nash
equilibrium HN
[143]
Multi-item
auction MNOs CPs
Cache
storages
At each iteration, the CPs set prices for their storages. Given the prices, the
MNOs bid the most preferred storages using the preferred-storage graph. The
BFS algorithm is applied for the content-storage matching.
Nash
equilibrium HN
[147]
Profit
maximization CP User
Data
items
CP constructs demand profiles of the user. The CP runs an iterative algorithm
to determine optimal data items to be served and their optimal prices.
Optimal
solution HN
[148]
Contract
theory MNO CPs
Cache
storages
MNO applies the matching theory and the swap-based deferred acceptance
algorithm to assign storages to the CPs. The prices charged to the types of
CPs are based on VCG auction payment.
Optimal
solution HN
[150]
Contract
theory MNO CPs
Cache
storages
MNO applies the standard Lagrangian method to determine the optimal prices
and storages for types of CPs.
Optimal
solution HN
E
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y
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[151] VCG auction FH MNOs
Offloading
service
The ILP multi-objective optimization is used for selecting the winning MNOs.
The winners are charged based on the VCG payment policy.
Bayesian
Nash
equilibrium
HN
[153] VCG auction SBSs MBS
RBs and
power
The dynamic programming method with KKT conditions is used for selecting
the winning SBSs. The winners are charged based on the VCG payment policy.
Bayesian
Nash
equilibrium
HN
[32] ACA SBSs MBS MUEs
MBS adjusts the offloading price such that the total supply quantity equals the
demand quantity.
Walrasian
equilibrium HN
[156]
Stackelberg
game FH MNO
Data
traffic
FH determines the optimal offloading price, and then the MNO calculates the
optimal amount of traffic.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
[158]
Stackelberg
game FH MUEs Power
MUEs determine their optimal power demands. Then, the FH adjusts power
prices such that the total power demand equals the maximum power of the FH.
Stackelberg
equilibrium HN
TABLE XI: A summary of advantages and disadvantages of major approaches for wireless caching and mobile data offloading.
Major approaches Advantages Disadvantages
[136] • Achieve win-win solution and consider network and congestion effects • Support only one caching user
[143] • Support multiple CPs and multiple MNOs • Do not consider content replacement rates
[147] • Consider the proactive content provision • Support only one CP
[151] • Achieve multiple objectives • Have high computational complexity
demands. However, implementing the NFV and SDN in 5G
imposes several issues.
For the NFV, the first issue is that resource sharing among
multiple users can lead to congestion on the physical in-
frastructure as well as an unfair use of the resources. The
second issue is how to allocate different physical resources,
e.g., radio and storage capabilities, to the network slices so
as to maximize the profit of MNOs while satisfying the
requirements of network slices. To address the first issue,
pricing models, e.g., smart data pricing, can be applied to offer
incentives to users to use resources efficiently. For the second
issue, the iterative auction as proposed in [161] can be used
to allocate different types of resources to the network slices.
The profit maximization problem as discussed in [147] can be
adopted to model and solve the second issue. Additionally, the
combinatorial auction is a potential solution. However, these
approaches are generally centralized mechanisms which have
high computational complexity.
D. Incentive Mechanisms for Edge/Fog Computing
In the cloud computing, requests for cloud services such as
computation and storage will go through a BS and core net-
work to finally reach the cloud, i.e., remote data centers. How-
ever, given the massive dense users in 5G, such a paradigm
faces issues such as long latency, high operational costs, and
bandwidth bottlenecks at the BSs. To address the issues, the
edge/fog computing paradigm is used. By using near-user edge
devices such as fog servers, SBSs, e.g., picocells/femtocells,
and user devices, the edge/fog computing pushes the frontier
of cloud resources and services away from the remote data
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centers to the periphery or edges of the network [26]. As a
result, the edge/fog computing (i) significantly reduces the data
traffic, cost, and latency, (ii) alleviates the major bottleneck
and the risk of a potential point of failure, and (iii) provides
high levels of scalability, reliability, and automation. However,
to deploy the edge/fog computing infrastructure, the most
important step is how to attract the owners of the edge
devices to contribute their resources. Incentive mechanisms
using pricing and payment strategies can be used to guarantee
the stable scale of participants and QoS.
E. Power Allocation in Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access
(NOMA) systems
NOMA is expected to be a promising multiple access
technique for 5G due to its high spectrum efficiency. Indeed,
by exploiting the Successive Interference Cancellation (SIC)
technique, multiple users can use the same frequency at the
same time, but with different power levels. However, this raises
the power allocation issue. For example, how a BS allocates
power to the users to maximize the utilities of the BS and
the users subject to the transmit power constraint. To achieve
the win-win solution, the pricing models, e.g., based on the
Stackelberg game [162], can be adopted. Note that the power
allocated to one user affects not only the utility of that user
but also the utilities of other users due to the interference and
power constraint of the BS. Thus the interactions among the
users can be modeled as the non-cooperative game.
F. User Assignment in Full-Duplex (FD) Cellular Networks
In-band FD is also one of key enabling technologies in 5G
which can drastically increase the spectral efficiency. The FD
allows a BS to transmit downlink traffic to a downlink user
while simultaneously receiving uplink traffic from an uplink
user using the same frequency. However, if the uplink user and
the downlink user are not far enough from each other, the inter-
user interference between them becomes too high as the same
frequency is used. The inter-user interference reduces network
throughput and spectrum efficiency. Therefore, the problem
for the BS is to determine pairs of uplink users and downlink
users and their power allocation to maximize the spectrum
efficiency of all users in the network. Pricing models such as
the forward auction [155] and [91] can be used. In this case,
the uplink users, i.e., bidders, submit bids on the downlink
users, i.e., commodities, to the BS, i.e., the auctioneer. The
BS can match each uplink user with a downlink user such
that the interference caused by the two users is minimized.
In practice, in addition to bids, both uplink and downlink
users are required to provide their location information to the
BS for performing the user assignment. This naturally reveals
the users’ location information, and they have a high risk
from physical attacks by adversaries. The combination of the
forward auction and cryptographic algorithms can guarantee
an efficient and privacy-preserving assignment.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a comprehensive survey on the
applications of economic and pricing theories to resource
management in 5G wireless networks. Firstly, we have de-
scribed key 5G technologies and resource management issues.
Then, we have introduced and analyzed various economic and
pricing models with the aim to understand the motivations of
using these models in 5G wireless networks. Afterwards, we
have provided detailed reviews, analyses, and comparisons of
the economic and pricing approaches in solving a variety of
resource management issues, i.e., user association, spectrum
allocation, interference and power management, and wireless
caching and mobile data offloading. Finally, we have outlined
open issues as well as future research directions.
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